Military Intelligence

July-September 1986

Electronic Warfare



Features

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Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Volume 12 Number 3 July-September 1986

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COVER: This issue's cover illustrates the puzzle of applying EW assets against opposing forces. Authors Capt. M. S. Haenchen, Maj. Wayne M. Hall and Maj. John D. Skelton share their viewpoints with our readers concerning this contemporary subject.

from the Commander

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

Previously, I identified the intelligence system as organizations and equipment systems, extending from the forward line of troops to the national level, that satisfy commanders' intelligence needs. This article will concentrate on the *process* used by the system to produce the desired intelligence. Indeed, this process is the *intelligence cycle*. The resultant intelligence facilitates the efficient application of combat power and enhances supportive operations. In our business, "Timeliness is goodness;" otherwise, the intelligence system and the intelligence cycle are ineffective.

The intelligence cycle is covered in chapter two of FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis. Contingent on requirements, this key, four-phased process is conducted sequentially or concurrently. It is essential to the development of a professional intelligence corps. If I had to select one subject in which all MI professionals should be trained, the intelligence cycle would be my choice. My rationale lies within the intricacies of the cycle.

Those intimately familiar with the **directing** aspect of the cycle know collection management operations include requirement, mission and asset management responsibilities. They know the route requests for information and requirements follow: initially to the data base to ascertain whether the answer is on hand. If it is, a response is immediately sent to the requestor. If not, the collection manager must determine which agencies, among those available, can satisfy the requirement and task them. The manager must know characteristics and capabilities of sensors, collection agencies and activities at organic, higher and adjacent units. He must understand tasking procedures, which in some cases require familiarity with prescribed request formats, communications systems and routing of requests. Additionally, the manager must be aware of lead times required for sensor taskings, need for redundancy or repeated area coverage. Essentially, these are collection planning and collection management functions. Collection management is an aspect of directing that is key to intelligence, as sensor location accuracies improve and all-weather, day-night capabilities materialize.

The **collection** phase of the cycle appears to be deceptively mundane. Individuals familiar with collection will know the capabilities and the functions of the collection assets (organizations, systems and activities). They will have hands-on experience with those systems and organizations at least to division level. Corps-level knowledge is the objective. This knowledge enhances their capability to supervise subordinates engaged in collection.

Those schooled in the **production** aspect of the intelligence cycle are prized assets. The timely analysis, correlation and fusion of the spectrum of intelligence disciplines is the heart and soul of our business. These young officers, warrant officers and NCOs will realize that commanders know good analysts are invaluable because they represent the expertise that not only develops targets for destruction and electronic warfare, but tells the who, what, when, why, where and how of adversarial intent and action. They will also realize that good commanders know intelligence drives and supports operations of all types. It is a symbiotic synergism that includes all aspects of the enemy, weather, terrain and *friendly forces*. I emphasize friendly forces because we sometimes forget the critical importance of knowing them, their capabilities and tactics for their employment. Additionally, at the battalion and brigade levels, these S2 officers and noncommissioned officers will be the resident analytical experts. Today's ICS graduates can handle these responsibilities and maintain an effective S2/S3 relationship. In most cases, the principal intelligence officers at higher echelons will not be the resident analytical experts because of the magnitude of the intelligence production effort. But, regardless of rank and assigned echelon, knowledge of the process and value of analytical skill is mandatory. To reiterate: The most serious failure of intelligence, in peace and war, is a failure in analysis.

Officers trained in **dissemination** are sensitized to timeliness of intelligence, as a result of training on **production** aspects of the intelligence cycle. Consequently, they are keenly aware of the need to place timely intelligence into the hands of the decisionmaker. They are familiar with the available communications assets, regardless of their specified purposes. These officers, then, have knowledge of multiple, organizational, communications capabilities that may be used to provide timely intelligence. I avoided using the words *intelligence communications* or *dedicated communications* because we may not have that luxury. The appropriate commander will direct the means of dissemination, as the situation's urgency dictates.

In conclusion, the intelligence cycle is the foundation of the intelligence corps and its mastery, the hallmark of MI professionals. ***Toujours en avant***—*Always out Front!*

from the CSM

CSM Robert H. Retter

The chief of Military Intelligence has decided to consolidate the training of our enlisted leaders at the advanced course level at Fort Huachuca. Throughout the study phase leading to this decision I have been a strong advocate of consolidation. It is my belief that if noncommissioned officers meet on common ground, share common experiences, and work and socialize together, they emerge with a common sense of purpose.

As the Military Intelligence Branch undergoes a renewing of its sense of purpose in its activation as the Military Intelligence Corps in July of next year, it is the mutual respect and sense of purpose of the noncommissioned officer leadership which will ensure our success. As the Sergeant Major of the Corps, it is my intent that the spirit of cohesion and affiliation envisioned in the regimental system be stronger among the Military Intelligence noncommissioned officers than anywhere else in the Army. The consolidation of the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course presents an opportunity to begin building the bonds of common experience, common purpose, and cohesion among Military Intelligence leaders.

Borrowing some words from Maj. Gen. Julius Parker: "It is of the utmost importance that the leadership of the Corps, especially the NCO leadership, identify with the Home of the Corps, and understand and appreciate its role in determining how we are organized, trained and equipped, how we fight, and its functions in personnel life cycle management for affiliated soldiers."

Combat developments, doctrine, and personnel management are areas where significant, fast-paced developments are occurring. Consolidation allows each responsible directorate here at the Home of Military Intelligence to offer information to each class as it develops. This benefit alone makes consolidation worthwhile.

The new course will be taught in the new and expanding academic complex. Maj. Gen. Parker has asked me to review the courses currently taught and use the best features of both. We are going to draw together the best talent for instructors. The senior noncommissioned officer leadership worldwide has been asked to suggest course content. A task group has been assembled, under my direction, to produce an Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course by and for the Military Intelligence noncommissioned officer which, again in Maj. Gen. Parker's words, "will be a positive, enriching professional happening in the careers of our enlisted leadership."

We have 23 Military Occupational Specialties within Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence noncommissioned officers operate at every echelon. We have a common bond in the overall Military Intelligence mission. Military Intelligence noncommissioned officers also have a common purpose in the training, education, and welfare of junior soldiers. Our approach to these common objectives has too often been as varied as our backgrounds. There are aspects of soldiering and leading which when applied, differ by location, echelon or mission. The new Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course will bring soldiers of all Military Intelligence skills and backgrounds together. Ideas will be exchanged and valuable noncommissioned networks will be formed across disciplines and echelons. The experiences and ideas brought to the Home of Military Intelligence by advanced course students will be of great assistance to those here at the school. Noncommissioned officer input will influence how the Corps fights, how it is organized, equipped and trained, and how its soldiers are professionally developed. Attendance at the consolidated Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course at the Home of Military Intelligence will be the only point in an entire career where this can happen. It is also the best point in a career for it to happen. I think consolidation is a good idea and I am anxious to make the most of it.

Behind the Lines

Knowledge is power. For the military intelligence professional, this timeless tenet is considerably more applicable today. Technological advances are making it possible for the commander to consistently see and affect more of the battlefield. With the advent of Air-Land Battle doctrine and the 360 degree battlefield, the intelligence community must continue to provide commanders with timely and accurate intelligence.

The intelligence corps is also faced with a special challenge in the personnel arena. The acquisition of non-military intelligence professionals, through the implementation of Force Alignment Plan 111, is adding another dimension to the corps: combat arms experience. This experience will expand the horizons of military intelligence professionals and reduce informational shortfalls in friendly tactics, organization and doctrine. The fusion of friendly and enemy doctrinal skills will equate to a more diversified and knowledgeable intelligence corps. Cross-training and mutual support within our branch is vital if we are to satisfy the commander's needs.

Our professional skill development is never complete. We must constantly endeavor to improve our capabilities. We need to explore and analyze as many forums for progressive thought as possible.

One such forum, the Military Intelligence Branch journal, provides the intelligence community with information on many diversified topics. While a main feature topic might be represented on the cover, it is not intended to dominate the issue. As the new editor, my goal is to provide a thought provoking, contemporary, intelligence tool. The editorial staff encourages you to read, think and react. Your support is essential to maintain the high level of respect our branch journal has earned. Progressive and analytical thought will increase our knowledge of the intricacies of intelligence and its applications on the modern battlefield.

William A. Ruiello

Editor

feedback . . .

Dear Editor:

Even the most indolent student of military affairs will have noticed the increasing volume of material concerning Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). What is the reason for this expansion? I believe that there are two very gripping answers. First, there is a growing awareness that a realistic and foreseeable military threat to U.S. interests lies not only in the rolling plains and valleys of Europe, but in many insidious, mostly communist inspired insurgencies in the Third World. Second, the U.S. military forces are involved in three of the LIC missions ***now****: counterinsurgency (FID), terrorism counteraction, and peacekeeping operations. The fourth mission, peacetime contingency operations, is with us always and, by its nature, is quickly planned and executed.*

In all of the LIC missions, good intelligence is vital; paradoxically, it may be more difficult to obtain than in high intensity conflict, as the enemy will seldom wear uniforms or be in standardized units. The challenge to professional intelligence officers is tremendous. This challenge can be approached and discussed. ***Military Intelligence*** *magazine provides a valuable forum to air thoughts and experiences concerning LIC. I encourage readers to submit articles, and to give LIC the cathexis it warrants in the intelligence profession.*

Maj. Hugh Webb
Intelligence Corps (United Kingdom)
Chief, Low Intensity Task Group
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Dear Editor:

Many Russian linguists in the military community, as well as Soviet affairs analysts may not be aware of the tremendous opportunities for language refresher training and cross-cultural "immersion" that exists in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, N.Y. It is definitely one alternative to traveling to the Soviet Union (which is not always feasible); it offers a low-cost method for improving one's language skills and provides greater insights into many aspects of Soviet life.

The area, also known as "Little Odessa," has a myriad of Russian restaurants and delicatessens, at least one excellent Russian bookstore, video stores with scores of Russian language selections, and much more. Brighton Beach offers much to those who will seek out its treasures. A friend of mine recently purchased an entire 12 volume set on the Soviet history of World War II at a local bookstore for a minimal amount. The store acquired the set from a Soviet immigrant in the neighborhood. The collection is virtually unobtainable as a set.

Once in Brighton Beach which is located near Coney Island, one may pick up a copy of ***Novoye Russkoye Slovo*** *(The New Russian Word), the primary daily newspaper in the emigre community. This serves as a guide to events in New York for Russian-speaking people including concerts, Soviet emigre veterans' meetings, etc. It also contains important articles on the Soviet Union from a multitude of sources.*

However, Brighton Beach is a "rough" neighborhood for those not acquainted with life in New York City. A recent issue of ***Novoye Russkoye Slovo*** *quoted a presidential commission on organized crime in the United States, which stated that there are allegedly some "12 groups of Russian organized crime" in New York consisting of 400-500 persons. These are in no way representative of the many thousands of hard-working Soviet immigrants who are, for the most part, extremely thankful to be in America. Also, be aware that most financial transactions in Brighton Beach are conducted with cash—most establishments won't accept credit cards.*

There are numerous other "pockets" of Soviet emigres in other cities across America, but none quite rival Brighton Beach. If some 40,000 ex-Americans lived in one place in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Americanists would beat a path to their door. We should take better advantage of this national resource, utilizing it for language and cultural training, as well as welcoming those who have sought refuge on our shores.

James Melnick
Soviet Affairs Analyst
4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg

Dear Editor:

1st Lt. Matthew H. Adams states in his article, "Operation Barbarossa: The Failure of German Intelligence," ***(Military Intelligence****, January-March 1986), "That the Soviet Armed Forces were beset by the purges did not escape the notice of Adolf Hitler." It is my understanding that German intelligence learning of Stalin's paranoia instigated the purges. The mastermind of this operation was Reinhard Heinrich, considered by the allies as the most dangerous man in Germany.*

The T-34 was not a surprise to German intelligence, it was a surprise on the battlefield. I'm sure in the next war there will be more surprises. German intelligence obviously did not tell the soldiers of this weapon in order to protect their sources.

My experience as a scout platoon leader and now as BICC officer leads me to believe that intelligence collected goes up the chain of command more often than down, with the exception of weather reports. Solve that problem and you can rest assured of a job well done.

1st Lt. Richard L. Jones
BICC 1/63 Armor

Dear Editor

As a former Army Reservist (MOS 96B), I have continued to maintain a list of documents concerning international affairs that I began some years ago. Listed below are some excerpts which I trust will contribute substantially to the ongoing studies of terrorism as represented in ***Military Intelligence*** *magazine.*

Wayne L. Thieme Jr.
Seattle, Wash.

The American Sentinel*, An authoritative report on left-wing activities. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 7315 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 1200N, Bethesda, Md. 20014.*

Covert Intelligence*, Horizon, Box 67, St. Charles, Mo. 63302. Articles on terrorism, espionage, mercenaries and associations.*

Conflict: All Warfare Short of War*, edited by George Tanham. Crane, Russak and Co., N.Y.*

Directory of the American Left*, Laird Wilcox, Editorial Research Service, P.O. Box 1832, Kansas City, Mo. 64141.*

Estimates of the Situation*, Security and Intelligence Fund, 499 S. Capitol St. SW, Washington, D.C. 20003. Contains articles about FBI and CIA activities and status, combatting crime and Communism.*

Hilaire du Berrier Report*, P.O. Box 786, St. George, Utah 84770. Contains intelligence reports, based on European contacts.*

(Continued on page 51)

Coordinating Forward Deployment of Divisional SIGINT/EW Elements

by Maj. John D. Skelton

Casualties caused by "friendly fire" or "amicicide" may account for up to two percent of the combat casualties suffered by American forces, based upon an analysis by Lt. Col. Charles R. Shrader in his insightful study entitled **Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War**, published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1982. "By far the most significant causative factor in all gound amicicide incidents appears to have been some lack of adequate coordination between units . . . the misidentification of friendly for enemy troops was also a frequent cause."

Divisional and reinforcing corps, ground-based SIGINT/EW assets normally deploy to and operate from brigade or maneuver battalion (task force) areas. These elements usually consist of six to 15 soldiers and two to four vehicles. To reduce the possibility of amicicide and to minimize interference with friendly maneuver units, as well as to enhance security and logistics support to SIGINT/EW elements, coordination with the commander "owning the terrain" occupied or traversed by those SIGINT/EW elements is essential. Often this coordination does not occur because it is not required. The belief that it is only an exercise obscures the penalty for failing to coordinate the forward movement of these assets. In combat, this failure can disrupt SIGINT/EW support operations conducted in sector or zone. In a combat situation, the failure can be catastrophic if the SIGINT/EW elements are erroneously engaged by friendly units. Such engagement by "friendly forces" has been noted at the National Training Center and during other exercises.

This article outlines a concept for coordinating and controlling deployment of SIGINT/EW elements into brigade/battalion sectors (defense) or zones (offense). Although primarily oriented toward support of a "heavy" division, the concept may be applied with modifications for support of light, motorized, airborne and infantry divisions.

Development of the "MI Company Team" doctrine has generally resolved the issue of who commands forward deployed SIGINT/EW assets; however, the control of those assets requires further development. Locational control of SIGINT/EW assets is somewhat more complex than control of other CEWI assets (ground surveillance radars), since they are not usually "attached" to the brigade. Also, SIGINT/EW assets differ from HUMINT assets (counterintelligence personnel and prisoner of war interrogators), which are often centrally controlled and are deployed forward as the exception rather than the rule. This article addresses locational control rather than technical control of SIGINT/EW assets, although the two are obviously interrelated.

Ground based SIGINT/EW assets from the divisional Military Intelligence battalion, as well as reinforcing corps level and attached SIGINT/EW assets from other organizations (e.g. units in reserve) are usually employed under division control in a general support role. These elements move vertically and laterally across the division area of operations, often crossing boundaries of several units. Tactical maneuver commanders must know the location of these elements at all times to prevent destruction or capture. The SIGINT/EW assets must maintain communications with the local command group. The MI company team commander has command responsibility for ensuring that SIGINT/EW elements

are properly positioned; however, the company team commander may not have communications available to coordinate or control deployment of forward deployed SIGINT/EW assets. Terrain masking or other radio limitations may also limit the ability to communicate with forward elements "on the move." To overcome this, the company team commander or the military intelligence battalion technical control and analysis element (TCAE) must coordinate forward movement, positioning and displacement of SIGINT/EW elements through the battalion's appropriate brigade intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE).

To emplace or displace ground based SIGINT/EW assets forward of the maneuver battalion (task force) rear boundary, the IEWSE can provide essential data (size of element, start point, start time, route, destination, call sign/frequency for the element, etc.) to the brigade S3 section, which in turn can advise the appropriate battalion S3(s) of the planned movement. Movement of the SIGINT/EW element should not commence until the battalion controlling the terrain has acknowledged the planned movement. The brigade intelligence net may also be used for this coordination if the brigade SOP authorizes such a procedure. When this coordination is accomplished via the intelligence net, the respective S2 must staff the action with the S3, who is responsible for tracking friendly unit locations and coordinating tactical operations and unit movements in the area of operations.

After establishing security at the new site, the leader of the SIGINT/EW element promptly accomplishes face-to-face coordination with the battalion S2, company commander or other representative of the commander "owning the terrain." This coordination will include security, vehicle identification, precise location, routes of ingress/egress, logistics and other appropriate issues. The forward deployed SIGINT/EW elements will normally maintain secure FM communications with the brigade IEWSE, its platoon operations center, and possibly the TCAE if the distance is within radio range.

The movement of logistics elements (e.g. contact teams) to support SIGINT/EW elements in the forward areas must also be coordinated in the manner described above. This is a particularly critical action for the military intelligence battalion executive officer, S4, BMO and CE maintenance officer to consider. Each MI battalion standing operating procedure must clearly establish procedures for coordinating logistics support for forward deployed SIGINT/EW assets.

Summary

The number of SIGINT/EW elements operating across the division front will usually total less than 15 stations, some of which can be colocated to reduce the number of sites required. The IEWSE at the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) can coordinate deployment of SIGINT/EW elements into the forward battalion sectors/zones by working with the brigade S2/3 to coordinate with forward deployed battalions. The leader of the forward deployed SIGINT/EW element is responsible for coordinating promptly with the unit controlling the immediate area occupied by the SIGINT/EW element. Refining procedures to coordinate the forward positioning of ground based SIGINT/EW assets and support elements must be stressed in all exercises where CEWI assets train with and support divisions, brigades and battalions. ★

An AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM is in position and is providing support during recent REFORGER exercises.

Maj. John D. Skelton is currently chief, Test Division, United States Army Intelligence and Security Board at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. He has served as a G2 operations officer, MI battalion S3 and MI battalion XO. He was a platoon leader with the 371st Radio Research Company in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the Vietnam conflict. Maj. Skelton commanded Company A, Army Security Agency Support Group, at Fort Meade, Md. from 1971-1973.

Combined Electronic Warfare

Do's and Don'ts from a Company Grade Perspect



by Capt. M. S. Haenchen

Electronic Warfare (EW) is an issue of ever-increasing interest both within the United States Army and among our allied partners. Perhaps the reason for this positive trend is the growing worldwide subject appreciation and an inclusive shift in modern warfare's doctrinal priorities. Yet, the inevitable nature of combined EW operations is largely unappreciated. When one recognizes the long-term effects of resource austerity in conjunction with expanding roles, responsibilities and missions, the shrewd command approach demands educated conduct of combined EW operations. Recognition of need, however, does not allay concerns for the stimulation of subject interest; familiarity must first be established.

The following comments are provided to peak interest and curiosity in combined EW operations. It is intended that by sharing some basic and philosophical information with those of you who are unfamiliar with this key fact of our craft, you may invest your personal and organizational resources to resolve a verified shortcoming. Further, should your imagination be tapped, your commander take more effective advantage of combined opportunities, or your disagreement cause a personal review of your own beliefs, we of the intelligence corps will ultimately benefit.

DO participate and rehearse as many combined EW operational activities as possible (both real world and training exercise related).

- You'll learn their operational techniques, which differ dramatically

in Europe:
ve

from our own and, on occasion, are better. Further, you'll share mission objectives, whether they concern a technique of frequency usage determination or something more traditional in nature.

• You'll eliminate the novelty aspect of combined events and verify our self-evident cooperation.

• You'll finally develop a true awareness of EW contingency mission problems ranging from collection site selection to passage of technical data.

• You'll gain new insight into the local environment which will include such issues as reconnaissance, signal density, and unique corps area issues.

DO invest the resources to master the appropriate approval process.

• You'll gain an appreciation for what previously was a complex maze of prerequisites.

• You'll fully understand and recognize the necessity for established confines and constraints.

• You'll conclude that the process has been simplified to a great extent with many new innovations, bilateral agreements, and increased assistance from national authorities.

• You'll realize that your counterpart has, in many cases, an even more demanding process—yet his enthusiasm for combined operations is renowned.

DO learn to clearly articulate techniques, functions, and requirements when involved in combined EW activities.

• You'll realize that we tend to use generic or philosophical terms, as opposed to our counterpart's facility and inclination to use technical verbiage. Have your most experienced advisor at your side for all meetings—your counterpart will.

• You'll limit resource expenditures and avoid waste by dealing directly with issues rather than exchanging explanations.

• You'll realistically improve our intelligence support to the tactical commander, regardless of his nationality, through precise articulation.

• You'll improve the worldwide reputation and professional respect for Military Intelligence through your efforts.

DO stress, with every opportunity, the crucial necessity of compatible, encrypted communications.

• You'll be supporting the need for increased awareness of one of the most inherent and difficult operational limitations. Remember: the absence of timely, effective communications will, quite simply, change the finest intelligence organization into a historical gathering.

• You'll gain a technical appreciation of your counterpart's communications and thereby his EW operational strengths and weaknesses.

DO develop an understanding and appreciation of technical formats and their content.

• You'll be prepared to confront this ever present hurdle in combined EW operations and be confident of any interim modifications negotiated with your counterpart.

• You'll be able to suggest future format applications within our own system from a position of expertise, issue sensitivity, and practical application.

DON'T rely on solving interoperability demands by instituting "liaison teams."

• You'll mislead your organization to an erroneous opinion of combined EW operational requirements.

• You'll perpetuate a current and widespread misconception of wartime capabilities which depend on nonexistent personnel and equipment.

DON'T be hesitant to change organizational prerogatives to match your counterpart organization.

• You'll miss out on those operational techniques, i.e., improved "front end analysis," which our partners have sophisticated through the years.

• You'll avoid a valuable opportunity to perform both technique assessment and creative modification within established doctrinal limitations. (Example: practical experience gained by U.S. tasking of an EW partnership asset.)

DON'T allow an occasional difference in subject knowledge to become an irritant to combined EW operations.

• You'll come to acknowledge that different armies (with their associated training programs and techniques) have a number of stressed variations, e.g., subject matter expertise, to our own.

• You'll develop a more internationally-flavored opinion of our craft and potentially influence future com-

(Continued on page 54)

AirLand Battle Doctrine and IEW Operations



by Maj. Wayne M. Hall

In the future, war will be strongly influenced by a continuous quest for certainty.[1] Although flawless battlefield intelligence has always been the ideal, this goal has been unattainable due to limited collection assets, weather, terrain, deception and human error. In fact, Clausewitz labeled intelligence as a friction of war: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncertain . . . . The difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected."[2]

The quest for certainty is motivated by several factors. First, the risk of failure caused by invalid information is high. Second, a fast paced, lethal and non-linear battlefield reinforces the requirement for accurate and timely information appropriate for making decisions. Third, modern technology in the form of sensors, computers and communications devices has enabled us to come closer than ever to the ideal. While AirLand Battle doctrine does not assume perfect knowledge, it assumes the presence of an intelligence system that can provide timely and accurate intelligence. This reliance, in turn, places a significant amount of pressure on U.S. Army intelligence officers to provide critical input into the command and control process.

The quest for certainty on the modern battlefield will almost certainly fail. This assertion is aptly reinforced by the German World War II Gen. F.W. Mellenthin who stated, "Only in rare cases can an army obtain a complete picture of the enemy's situation before an attack is launched, even when reconnaissance has been detailed and thorough."[3] This notion implies the need for a significant amount of flexibility to be built into plans; moreover, it implies a capabil-

ity to cope with unexpected events on the battlefield.

One of the most significant constraints that prevents "truth" from being known is that U.S. forces will be in a life and death duel against an intelligent, active foe who is attempting to protect his action from observation. When coupled with major variables such as chance, weather and terrain, an intelligent and active enemy presents a formidable obstacle in the quest for certainty.

Another constraint lies in the inherent frailty of the human mind. Generally, human beings want facts before they act. This is especially true when the stakes are high. However, predicating action on "facts" remains as fallacious today as it was 180 years ago when Clausewitz wrote. Due to our inclination to distort reality and the presence of a bright, active foe attempting to create false images in our mental constructs, the truth will never be known.

The quest for certainty will not abate with the advent of AirLand Battle doctrine. In fact, the quest will grow in intensity for three principal reasons. First, we are ultimate believers in the "magic" of technological solutions to difficult problems; therefore, our growth in technological capabilities will fuel a corresponding increase in the belief that we can know the present and the future. Second, the characteristics of AirLand Battle doctrine—maneuver, indirect approach, moral ascendency and a non-linear battlefield—imply the need to take great risks. Commanders will want to ensure that they are taking risks as opposed to gambles. Last, the doctrine implies a need to plan into the future. Yet, most of us are neither educated nor trained to deal with the future, let alone to approach the battlefield from a holistic, systems view which is a requisite for planning in the future.

Institutionally, we tend either to develop or buy bigger and more sophisticated machines to help see the future and to transform gambles into risks. After all, the United States has the most advanced technology in the world. Yet, one must ponder the possible effects of the endless technological expansion without a corresponding increase in intellectual development. That is, one must have a modicum of mental capability in order to make anything meaningful out of what technology provides. Furthermore, technology must be focused to serve as a means to an end; technology is impotent unless it serves to further a higher purpose.

Army Intelligence is at an exciting time in its history. The Army's doctrine for executing combat operations to achieve national objectives depends on timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence, to include technology and mental capability, provides the focus for the execution of the doctrine. Furthermore, intelligence provides assessments of what our opponents know and intend to do. Most advocates of AirLand Battle doctrine call out vigorously for understanding the principles of war and theoretical support of AirLand Battle doctrine to unleash its full potential. Thus, intelligence officers must interpret and understand the doctrine in order to gain insight into the variables of war. If intelligence officers fail to understand the meaning of AirLand Battle doctrine and its implications for Army intelligence, technological and functional knowledge will be meaningless.

"The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine . . . are dependent on timely, accurate intelligence and effective IEW operations."

The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine (initiative, agility, synchronization and depth) are heavily dependent on timely, accurate intelligence and effective Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) operations. This relationship with IEW is applicable at all levels after allowing for differences in scope, timing, space, perspective, constraints and opponent objectives among the levels of war.

How does good intelligence contribute to the AirLand Battle tenet of **initiative**? Initiative should, in most cases, be guided by intelligence. Moreover, IEW operations can tell the commander when he has attained the initiative. All operations must be permeated with the offensive spirit inherent in AirLand Battle doctrine. This spirit, then, must be harnessed by the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. IEW operations cannot be reactive; they must be offensively oriented and active. In this regard, retired Gen. William DePuy states, "Detecting the mass and movement of the main force is interesting . . . and important. Constructing a winning battle concept of operations around that information is decisive."[4] Intelligence should be used to create, develop or shape situations complementary to the friendly commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. When being focused by AirLand Battle doctrine, IEW operations must accomplish more than situation and target development;[5] the intelligence officer must *actively* advise the commander on the effects of threat, terrain, weather, EW, deception and OPSEC upon various courses of action under consideration. The intelligence officer must teach commanders and operators how IEW can be used either to destroy or defeat enemy forces; IEW cannot be construed merely as a means of passive information gathering or protection.

IEW contributes to the tenet of **initiative** by helping to differentiate between concepts of gamble and risk. Taking independent action, for example, in the absence of accurate information could be considered a gamble, which could jeopardize the unit and the intent of the higher commander.

Initiative falls into the psychological domain of war; it is a mental construct influenced by both physical experience and mental images. Physical experience, for example, involves sudden, unexpected attacks on an important enemy center of gravity. These create mental images in the minds of enemy commanders and soldiers. The influence on the mental outlook of enemy commanders and soldiers links with seizing and retaining the initiative. IEW operations are the most important part of constructing mental images; they provide direction, sources for focusing attacks and indicants of effect.

Agility, a second key tenet of AirLand Battle doctrine, has several IEW related functions or activities. First, we must know the enemy decision cycle. Second, the enemy's definition of combat power must be understood. Third, the enemy situation must be

developed extensively and updated continuously to identify exploitable vulnerabilities. This knowledge and understanding will enable us to influence the enemy's decision cycle faster than he can affect ours. Fourth, the intelligence system must provide information to the friendly commander on the effectiveness of manipulating the enemy's decision cycle. Furthermore, the intelligence system must continue to identify vulnerabilities for possible attack or manipulation. Fifth, the intelligence officer has to understand the characteristics of the U.S. Army's combined arms team and how the synergistic effects of combat can affect, either physically or mentally, the enemy's decision cycle. Physical influence, for example, could be destruction of a command post; mental influence could be the manipulation of the enemy commander's thought processes in order to make him react rather than act.

Overall, intelligence assists in the effort to assure the commander's capability to **synchronize** combat power. The IEW activities directly related to synchronization include: electronic warfare, intelligence support to OPSEC and deception, intelligence support to C^3CM, collection planning and dissemination, targeting and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Substandard performances in any of these areas could result in a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of synchronization.

To achieve the synchronization necessary to maximize our combined arms operations, enemy intelligence collection and efforts to generate combat power must be denied or manipulated to present false images. The IEW system identifies where the combined arms team can strike to achieve the greatest effect, and helps to identify windows of opportunity to inflict the greatest degree of damage on enemy forces. These "windows" must be correlated with the old maxim: march divided; strike united. That is, the points of enemy vulnerability and the time that the vulnerability exists must be relative to the time necessary to coalesce combined arms combat power and the protection of the combat power we are trying to synchronize.

AirLand Battle doctrine is predicated on disrupting, delaying or destroying enemy second echelon forces. Because Soviet theoretical underpinnings revolve around the notion of depth, and because AirLand Battle doctrine identifies the way we intend to fight the Soviets, the tenet of **depth** is particularly apropos for the U.S. Army.

While the Soviet use of battle array *en echelon* in Central Europe is somewhat contentious, we can assume they will keep forces in some form of echelon to provide commanders with operational flexibility. Thus, we must defeat their capability to strike deep into our operational rear with air, maneuver and fire support. This aspect of the doctrine is directed at an enemy who knows our intentions and will anticipate our efforts to separate his mass and defeat his fragmented forces.

We must be intimately familiar with the enemy's doctrine, weapons systems and organization to support the concept of depth. However, the enemy's intentions and thought processes will forecast his actions and his reactions. Enemy efforts to influence the friendly commander's decision cycle through rear area operations require anticipation. Conversely, friendly actions to control the enemy's use of depth and to maintain the enemy commander's decision cycle suggest that depth is a multi-faceted concept. That is, depth is relative to both enemy and friendly intentions. We must thwart their intentions to achieve operational victory through depth; moreover, we must attack deep to disrupt their tempo and to seize the initiative. IEW operations, if planned correctly, will provide the type of information needed to fight the enemy using the concept of depth.

"AirLand Battle doctrine is predicated on disrupting, delaying or destroying enemy second echelon forces."

To operate against echelons of divisions, armies, fronts and TVDs, friendly forces must be able to see deep and strike deep. During the 1950s and 1960s, efforts to see deep were inhibited by inadequate technology. But, due to advances in technology in the 1970s and 1980s and through access to both joint and national collection assets, we now have the capability to see deep,[6] albeit not with the desired assurance of quality or quantity. The importance of seeing deep is attested to by the current TRADOC commander, Gen. William R. Richardson who states: "The key . . . is the emergence of a wide range of surveillance and target acquisition sensors which can

move intelligence in near real time to the tactical commander for his use. These sensors . . . serve as the basis for attacking enemy follow-on forces with artillery, BAI, attack helicopters, irregular forces and the nonlethal weapons of jamming and deception."[7]

The seeing deep requirement imbedded in AirLand Battle doctrine has several important implications for the intelligence officer. These implications include:

- Knowing the characteristics of collection systems regarding continuous coverage assets.
- Appreciating the need for rapid, complete all-source analysis of collected information.
- Appreciating the criticality of rapid dissemination of pertinent information which expedites and improves decision making.
- Understanding the relationships between seeing deep, commander's intent and focused combat power of the combined arms team.
- Understanding the relationships between seeing deep, commander's intent, mass, maneuver, surprise, speed, secrecy, deception and OPSEC.

Deep attack is another important concept imbedded within the doctrine. Deep attack against the Soviets "complements the central concept of operations. It is neither a side show nor an optional activity without importance to the outcome of battle. It is an inseparable part of a unified plan of operation."[8] Deep attack cannot be

conducted with any degree of reliability without accurate and timely intelligence. One author states, "The deep battle is based on a thorough IPB, the availability of timely intelligence from organic and higher level intelligence sources, the identification of high value targets, and the synchronization of organic and supporting attack means."[9] Deep attack is predicated on an extensive relationship with intelligence that:

- Provides a thorough knowledge of the enemy including an assessment of his intentions.
- Enables the commander to see the battlefield in the dimensions espoused by AirLand Battle doctrine.
- Focuses intelligence collection and analysis efforts to support the commander's intent.
- Realizes and capitalizes on the relationship between deep attack and synchronization. The deep attack, whether maneuver, air or artillery, must be timed effectively, i.e., with some other portion of the commander's intent or at a critical point in the enemy's decision cycle.

The deep attack also figures prominently in the psychological domain of war. In this respect, the intelligence system's capability to see deep is necessary to understand the effect of deep attack on the enemy decision cycle, tempo and momentum. Both commanders and intelligence officers must realize the importance of seeing deep and deep attack in the interactive mental contrast with the opposing commander for control of initiative, tempo and momentum. Additionally, the deep attack has a significant effect on the minds of enemy commanders and soldiers. Such an attack, if placed and timed correctly, will position a formidable force in his rear area.

Intelligence is also closely related to several combat imperatives articulated in FM 100-5, **Operations**. **Unity of effort** is a combat imperative that has several broad meanings. FM 100-5 states: "Unity of effort requires that the commander and his staff see the battlefield realistically. To do this they must continuously study their resources, the enemy and the terrain from a perspective that extends from the unit's rear boundary to the forward edge of its area of interest."[10]

Commander's intent is of critical importance to this imperative; IEW operations are focused and, in fact, placed within the rubric of the commander's intent. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR), for example, must be directly identified and focused on by the commander's intent. Deception and force must be used to secure the force and create combat power effects. The commander's intent must be based on accurate and timely intelligence that is not distorted by the proclivity for human intellects to mirror image; otherwise, the intent could be based on false assumptions about an enemy imbued with "our" values.

Another imperative with implications for intelligence officers is the requirement to **direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.** To accomplish this, one must first have an in-depth knowledge of the enemy combat system at several echelons of command. Author Edward Luttwak aptly describes this as developing a "close understanding of the inner workings of the system that is to be disrupted . . . where an understanding of its command ethos and operational propensities will be necessary."[11] Second, there is a requirement for action that will deny the enemy's efforts to locate and exploit friendly weaknesses. Third, as previously discussed, the intelligence officer must know the U.S. combat system's capabilities and methods of employing the combined arms team. This knowledge would enable the officer to realistically appraise our capability to strike at enemy vulnerabilities. Fourth, this imperative connotes the strong linkage between the commander's intent and his higher commander's intent; intelligence operations help provide information that serves to guide that intent.

"Deep attack cannot be conducted with any degree of reliability without accurate and timely intelligence."

Another imperative of combat, **sustaining the fight**, has implications for intelligence. Though more subtle than those flowing from other imperatives, they are still important. These implications include the commander's ability to "deploy forces in adequate depth and arrange for timely and continuous combat and combat service support."[12] These operations will be jeopardized by the enemy's accurate perception of the U.S. Army's dependence on logistics. In this respect, we can expect the enemy to seek and destroy these assets. Thus, we can surmise enemy commanders will rely heavily on intelligence operations for their plan to work. Furthermore, we can surmise that the enemy will have effective ground and aerial intelligence assets to find, disrupt and destroy our combat, combat support and combat service support assets. This subtle relationship between enemy intelligence operations, enemy intent and combat power is critical to the friendly commander's scheme of maneuver. Friendly intelligence should identify ways to neutralize and manipulate the threat by controlling the images the enemy commander receives and, consequently, shaping his plan.

In general, intelligence implications of this imperative have not been given attention commensurate with potential impact. Once a friendly commander's efforts to move his assets to sup-

port combat operations is denied due to the effects of enemy intelligence, the importance of this imperative will be obvious. The Army must therefore emphasize intelligence support to both OPSEC and deception and actively conduct IPB in rear areas. Also, we must actively plan to conduct rear intelligence collection operations to find, neutralize or manipulate enemy intelligence collection assets. This activity must be done particularly at the division and corps levels of operation, due to their mission to sustain and maintain the tactical fight and to develop and implement operational plans.

Another combat imperative with particular relevance for intelligence is the use of **terrain and weather.** The implications of this imperative affect the capability to conduct successful combat operations. The importance of weather and terrain is attested to by the following statement in FM 100-5: "Weather and terrain have more impact on battle than any other physical factor, including weapons, equipment or supplies."[13] Terrain can provide a distinct advantage; the resourceful and wise commander will study and use terrain to accomplish his intent. To help the commander use the terrain, the intelligence officer must conduct detailed terrain analysis which should occur during the IPB process. Keeping in mind the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, the intelligence officer advises the commander how to use terrain effectively to defeat enemy forces. If coupled with aggressiveness, maneuver and offensive spirit, intelligent use of the terrain to achieve the commander's intent will offer a significant advantage.

Weather is also a significant portion of the battlefield equation. Clausewitz labeled weather as a friction of war owing to its unpredictability. The wise commander anticipates the ephemeral nature of weather and attempts to use it, in conjunction with the terrain, to satisfy his intent. Once again, when contemplating weather we must assess its significance from both perspectives.

Protect the force is an ageless prerequisite to successful combat operations. While the word protection connotes many different meanings, e.g., from destruction, NBC attack or encirclement, one of the most important aspects is protection from surprise. Surprise is critically important because it affects both the physical and psychological domains of war. Clausewitz discusses its importance and its dual effect: "The universal desire for relative numerical superiority is . . . to take the enemy by surprise. This desire is more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable. Surprise, therefore, becomes the means to gain superiority, but because of its psychological effect should also be considered as an independent element."[14]

Soviet military literature is replete with emphasis on achieving tactical and operational surprise; the concept fits nicely with their goal of a short, violent, high-tempo war in Central Europe. The two key ingredients in achieving surprise—secrecy and speed—[15] are important aspects of Soviet operational concepts. In this context our efforts to protect the force and prevent Soviet surprise must include extensive reconnaissance, proactive thinking, knowledge of Soviet reconnaissance, intelligence collection and deception operations.

This combat imperative relates specifically to the principle of security. While this relationship is obvious, the interactive nature of protecting the force and the principle of surprise is more obscure. Figure one shows a dynamic interplay between our efforts to secure the force while achieving surprise. The enemy, however, is doing the same thing. The resultant dynamic of interaction is an area where the advantage will be achieved by either enemy or friendly forces. One side will better protect its forces by anticipating enemy efforts to achieve surprise and will take effective countermeasures. Concurrently, one side will better achieve surprise by anticipating enemy efforts to protect its forces and use those efforts, deception and OPSEC to achieve surprise.



Figure 1

To protect the force, the intelligence officer must anticipate the enemy's plans to achieve surprise. Surprise is, after all, an operational principle for the Soviets. Creating the conditions for achieving surprise is relative to our capability to protect the force and to use enemy efforts to create conditions for achieving surprise. This

somewhat abstract rumination comprises the conceptual framework for using both deception and OPSEC in an active way to enable friendly forces to prevail over an intelligent and active foe.

The relationship between the commander's intent and IEW is strong under the aegis of AirLand Battle doctrine. The pressure for the intelligence officer to reduce uncertainty is stronger than ever because the commander's intent depends on the capability of the intelligence system to find the enemy and identify his intentions. The commander's intent shapes and drives intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination systems. The intelligence system is, therefore, a vital part of combat power; however, its effectiveness can only be discussed in relation to how it affects the commander's intent and his employment of the combined arms team.

"The two key ingredients in achieving surprise—secrecy and speed—are important aspects of Soviet operational concepts."

The doctrine also suggests the need for IEW to become recognized as a member of the combined arms team. While it can only be categorized as non-lethal, IEW is essential to successful combined arms operations for two principal reasons. First, intelligence, as discussed earlier, is a must for successful operations on a high intensity battlefield. It provides the direction for the employment of combined arms power; therefore, combined arms theory cannot exclude intelligence. Second, jamming is an important aspect of combined arms power; that is, if used correctly, it can complement the other members of the combined arms team by delaying, disrupting and deceiving enemy forces. When used judiciously, it is an effective combat multiplier and offensive non-lethal weapon system.

Officers must study the theory that supports AirLand Battle doctrine. Otherwise, they will never understand the way we intend to fight, how our discernment of it evolved, and how to use IEW operations effectively. Officers should learn theory through the study of military history and the works of theorists such as Clausewitz, Jomini and Sun Tzu. Additionally, intelligence officers have a particularly high intellectual burden to bear: They must know Soviet doctrinal theory. From such knowledge, intelligence officers must interpret and apply actual technologies to unleash the doctrine's full potential. Such an intellectual endeavor must occur both in the schools and in the field.

The nature of modern, high-intensity war—short, high tempo, maneuver oriented, lethal and surprise seeking—has increased the criticality of intelligence. However, the battlefield requires comprehensive knowledge of specific information and relationships that involve the battlefield as a whole. The intelligence officer, for example, must plan intelligence operations to support the commander's intent for deep, close and rear operations. While planning to protect exposed flanks, he must know how to achieve surprise and how it relates to enemy efforts to do the same.

Finally, the intelligence officer must understand U.S. organization, tactics, operations and equipment in order to engage in the high-level thinking that is essential to successful execution of AirLand Battle doctrine. The vulnerabilities of an opponent are only relevant if U.S. forces have the capability to attack those vulnerabilities.

Without question, AirLand Battle doctrine cannot be implemented without timely and accurate intelligence. This relationship has been underscored by discussing the specific relationship of IEW to doctrinal tenets and combat imperatives.

The intelligence officer, like all officers, must understand the characteristics of modern war and the additional pressures it creates. We must be able to think and execute in such an environment, and we must understand the nature of war. Clearly, we must be able to out think our foe in order to fight outnumbered and win. Intelligence officers can provide much of the requisite intellectual power to out think antagonists.

Intelligence officers must know the threat intimately to be able to assist commanders to execute doctrine at both tactical and operational levels. We must comprehend the implications of understanding the threat in relation to combat imperatives and tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine.

Finally, the intelligence officer must have depth of knowledge in friendly and enemy collection and dissemination systems from the tactical through national levels. IEW operations, just like other activities on a hypothesized

(Continued on page 53)

PLACE NAME RECOGNITION

by Maj. James A. Dunn

The Deputy G4 entered the room and welcomed the three brigade S4s who were attending the meeting. After getting the traditional cups of coffee, they sat down to discuss the field exercise in which the division would soon be participating.

"The G3 has verified that we will participate in Exercise Frozen Forest in precisely three months. The actual location of the exercise has not been announced; however, we will be maneuvering in the northern portion of Burkina Faso. As this is an area to which we have never deployed, it is imperative that we have the correct equipment and material to support a six week exercise. The G2 has ordered map sheets for the area, but they probably will not come in for several weeks. Begin determining your requirements and give me a tentative list tomorrow." Just then, the G4 sergeant major burst into the room and motioned to the deputy that the chief wanted to see him immediately. Unable to finish the meeting, the officer told the S4s to send him their "want lists" in the morning.

The following day the deputy G4 received the following lists from his fellow logisticians. First brigade: Special concern is that we have sufficient cold weather uniforms and Class III lubricants to enable the brigade to adequately function in the harsh weather during operations near Burkina Faso. Second brigade: Since the units will be operating in the Burkina Faso region and we have never conducted amphibious training there before, it is imperative that we arrange for special safety equipment and POL products as the salt water will cause a higher incidence of seal failure. Third brigade: Since the brigade has never operated in Africa before, there is a possibility that poor roads will severely test our vehicles. As such, we need to anticipate higher levels of suspension system failures than what occurred when we went to Europe. The G4 was surprised. Only one of the three officers knew where Burkina Faso was.

Awareness of the world's political organizations and spatial expression is an important skill. To be able to recognize a country or state, to be able to recall its correct name and relationship to its neighbors, and to understand its climate and culture is necessary if one is to understand the world. Mental mapping, the process we undergo when visualizing a place, is a skill that has received much attention in scholarly articles. A dynamic that has received less attention includes the ability to recall the spatial relationships of places and their names. To be able to "fill in the map" is a task that we are not faced with very often. It is, however, an indicator of our knowledge of the area in question and the level to which we have internalized place names and the spatial information of location. Although it is not as important in some career fields, the ability to recall geographic relationships is important to the military officer. As a profession that, by its very nature, requires this knowledge, the military officer should have a well founded knowledge of distant places and people, the world, and the locations of the countries that cover its surface.

One would expect that Army officers would have an adequate background in world geography since most units can be "deloyed anywhere in the world at a moment's notice." Recent military actions by the United States and other countries have taken place in locales that were relatively unknown to many members of the armed services. Two years ago, few leaders knew where Beirut, Chad, the Falklands and Grenada were, much less what to expect in terms of climate

or terrain. Today these places are relatively well known. However, if you have ever had to thumb through an atlas to find out what part of the world was being discussed in the news, you may appreciate the importance of this article. Although most leaders are fairly familiar with Europe, there are, perhaps, many that would not feel comfortable filling in a blank map of Africa, Central America or the Middle East.

In an attempt to determine how well soldiers could identify the different countries of the world, a simple exercise was administered to a number of future Army officers. These young people were enrolled in a pre-commissioning program and were all at least second-year college students. The fact that the participants were training to become second lieutenants should be noted; this was not a randomly selected group but consisted entirely of high school graduates who wanted to be Army leaders. Each student was issued a blank map of the world with clearly marked political boundaries. The participants were given 10 minutes to name all the countries they could identify. A total of 161 students participated in the exercise.

The completed maps were collected and evaluated. Each country in the world was evaluated as correctly identified, incorrectly identified, or not attempted. The raw data was formatted for use in a computerized mapping device, and composite maps of the world, as identified by the students, were prepared. The results indicated these "leaders in training" lacked significant global geographic knowledge.

Correct place name identification is one method to determine whether a country's name and location are known. Although the ability to correlate a name with a specific politically bound territory is just one indicator of spatial awareness, it is a rough indicator of the level of basic geographic knowledge. A total of 143 countries were correctly identified by the students (table 1). Since there are approximately 157 countries in the United Nations, this appears to be a good effort; however, many of the countries were identified correctly by only a few students. In fact, only 14 countries were correctly identified by greater than 80 percent of the students. Sixty percent of the 143 countries correctly identified were known by less than a fifth of the participants.

A quick glance at the countries correctly identified shows a general trend. Of all the countries identified, only 20 percent were correctly named by more than half of the respondents. Some were recognized quite well. For example, the North American landmass,

TABLE 1: Recognition levels - Major countries of the world

USA	100%	Israel	39%	Taiwan	14%	Niger	4%
Canada	100%	Greece	37%	Hungary	13%	Uganda	4%
Mexico	99%	Belgium	34%	Guyana	13%	Kuwait	4%
Australia	95%	Madagascar	34%	Haiti	12%	Cyprus	3%
USSR	94%	Pakistan	34%	Honduras	12%	Chad	3%
Italy	93%	Iran	32%	Sudan	12%	Jamaica	2%
Spain	92%	Turkey	31%	South Yemen	12%	Belize	2%
Brazil	92%	Kampuchea	30%	French Guinea	11%	Botswana	2%
France	90%	Peru	29%	Ethiopia	11%	Cent Afr Rep	2%
China	89%	Libya	29%	Indonesia	11%	Ghana	2%
Portugal	88%	New Zealand	28%	Costa Rica	10%	Mauritania	2%
United Kingdom	86%	Colombia	28%	Dominican Rep	10%	Togo	2%
Argentina	84%	Morocco	28%	Ecuador	10%	Oman	2%
India	84%	Afghanistan	28%	Falklands	10%	UAE	2%
Cuba	79%	Austria	25%	Angola	10%	Singapore	2%
West Germany	77%	Netherlands	25%	Tunisia	10%	Andorra	1%
East Germany	75%	Yugoslavia	24%	Zaire	10%	Liechtenstein	1%
Greenland	75%	Paraguay	24%	Bangladesh	10%	Bermuda	1%
Poland	71%	Venezuela	24%	Nepal	10%	Burundi	1%
Japan	69%	Iraq	23%	Bulgaria	9%	Cameroon	1%
Chile	63%	Antarctica (continent)	22%	Somalia	9%	Congo	1%
Vietnam	59%	El Salvador	21%	Guatemala	8%	Benin	1%
Egypt	58%	Laos	21%	Luxemburg	7%	Djibouti	1%
Panama	57%	Uruguay	19%	Albania	7%	Gambia	1%
South Africa	57%	Syria	19%	Namibia	7%	Guinea	1%
Iceland	55%	Yemen	18%	Malaysia	7%	Malawi	1%
Norway	53%	Lebanon	17%	Mozambique	6%	Mali	1%
Mongolia	53%	Philippines	17%	Zambia	6%	Senegal	1%
North Korea	51%	Denmark	16%	Burundi	5%	Sierra Leone	1%
South Korea	51%	Jordan	16%	West Sahara	5%	Tanzania	1%
Saudi Arabia	50%	Thailand	16%	Sri Lanka	5%	Burkina Faso	1%
Finland	49%	Romania	15%	Surinam	4%	Zambia	1%
Sweden	48%	Nicaragua	15%	Ivory Coast	4%	Qatar	1%
Ireland	45%	Bolivia	15%	Kenya	4%	Neutral Zone	1%
Switzerland	39%	Algeria	15%	Liberia	4%	Bhutan	1%
Czechoslovakia	39%	Papua New Guinea	15%	Nigeria	4%	Hong Kong	1%

as far south as Mexico, was well known. Other large political units were also recognized: Australia, USSR, China, India and Greenland. Size also seemed to figure prominently in the recognition levels of Brazil, the largest country in South America, and Argentina, the next largest. The remaining well-recognized countries included the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, West Germany and East Germany. Generally speaking, the most frequently recognized countries were large, unique in shape, or part of the European landmass.

50 percent recognition level: Saudi Arabia. Other countries added at this level include Vietnam, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. Central America, the Middle East and Africa are still almost completely unknown (map #1).

Results from other parts of the world are not encouraging. Central America is known to very few students (map #2). Only one country approaches the 60 percent recognition level; Panama was correctly plotted by 57 percent of the respondents. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize were correctly plotted by only 15 percent or less of the students. El Salvador, subject of countless news announcements in recent years, attained only a 21 percent recognition level. These results are unimpressive, especially when one considers that these countries almost border the United States.

The South American and African continents show a variety of levels of recognition (map #3). In general, South America fared better than Africa. Brazil, Argentina and Chile were well recognized, perhaps as a result of their distinctive sizes and shapes (not to mention the 1983 conflict in that region). Most other states, however, were known to less than 25 percent of the students. Africa is indeed the "dark continent" if the recognition levels demonstrated are correct. Only Morocco, Libya, Egypt and the Republic of South Africa were correctly named by more than 10 percent of the group. Morocco and Libya were both recognized at just below the 30 percent level while Egypt and the Republic of South Africa were the only two states on the continent known to more than 50 percent of the respondents.

Unfortunately, Asian countries are not more significantly recognized. Only Saudi Arabia, source of over 27 percent of the world's known oil reserves, could be correctly identified by half of the students. Israel, scene of turmoil and combat for over 40 years, was plotted correctly by only 39 per-

MAP 1: Recognition levels - The World



A computer generated map that depicts those countries correctly recognized by 50 percent of the students, displays this data nicely. The places just named are included as "recognized" entities, as well as several additional countries. In Central America and South America, only Chile and Panama were added. Europe gains only Iceland, Norway and Poland. Africa, unknown at higher levels, now depicts Egypt and the Republic of South Africa. The Middle East only includes one country at the

MAP 2: Recognition levels - Central America



cent of the group. In general, the average student could not correctly plot the countries whose names have figured prominently in the news over the past several years: Iran, 33 percent; Iraq, 23 percent; Syria, 19 percent and Lebanon, 17 percent. The Middle East has been an area of geographical interest to the United States, as well as an area that is highlighted in the news almost daily. It was well known to less than one third of the future officers. Southern Asia was little known with the exception of India. Southeast Asia was also poorly recognized. Vietnam was plotted by 59 percent of the group, but it is the only country identified higher than the 40 percent recognition level. Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia) fared slightly better than the rest but not significantly. The geographic knowledge of

MAP 4: Recognition levels - Asia



MAP 3: Recognition levels - South America and Africa



this region, which was all too familiar to Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s has now, for the most part, dissipated (map #4).

Many military leaders have stated that we train for the critical battle in Europe while it is more likely that our armed forces will be utilized in other sections of the world, sections that we apparently don't know enough about. We as military professionals cannot afford to be ignorant of global spatial arrangement and geography. This study does not claim to be completely scientific in its approach; therefore, one must be careful about what to deduce from it. One thing is clear; a significant number of these future leaders did not possess adequate geographical knowledge. This study would seem to indicate that one must not assume that our young leaders have a basic knowledge of the Army's "area of operations," the earth. Obviously, no one can hope to know all things about every place on the planet, but leaders should at least be familiar with major place names and general locations. To have anything less denotes a lack of basic knowledge that is disquieting.

Realizing that the problem exists is a crucial step in correcting the fault. We should not be surprised that high school graduates do not possess adequate geographic skills. Recent studies at other institutions have indicated that most college students are weak in this area. Although it is not the Army's job to teach high school geography, it is important that its leaders be skilled in recognizing places on the earth's surface and their respective cultural, socio-economic and political mores. This study, and others like it, serve as a warning that more effort in this area is warranted. ★

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Developments in Soviet High Commands

by Capt. Charles Duch

Recently, several articles analyzing current Soviet C³ developments, specifically the development of **high commands** in several TVDs have surfaced.[1] The Soviet military press has provided fuel for this analysis, as a burgeoning corpus of writing on military doctrine touching on troop control issues reflects that something important is happening out there. In evaluating the state of play in Soviet high command developments, this article will assess what is known about the high commands, where informed speculation takes the place of hard data, and why the current phase of Soviet troop control mandates the establishment of the high commands. Finally, it will assess the significance of C³ developments.

It appears that the Soviets have established four high commands *(glavnoye kommandovaniye)* of multiple fronts as intermediate wartime command echelons between **supreme high command** (*VGK, verkhovnoye glavnoye kommandovaniye*) and individual fronts. The first high command came into being in the late seventies in the Far East and is known as the High Command of Far Eastern Forces. The three other high commands, which surfaced in 1984, will control forces in Europe and Southwest Asia in wartime. Beyond these relatively simple facts, there is some contention among western analysts about exactly what the high commands are, where they are located, and what they are called. (See box on terminology.)

The reason for the variety of opinion on the high command issue is the paucity of hard data relative to the vast literature of Soviet writing on military doctrine, history of military art and organizational development and the principles of troop control, all of which provide the basis for inference or alternatively, fuel for speculation.

It is useful to note, for example, that hard data is lacking on the military geography of the high commands (as opposed to the geography of TVDs). Charts which purport to depict the areas of operation of the various high commands are at best useful inferences based on a substantive amount of related data. This data includes the history of Soviet C³ in World War II and the general deployment of Soviet troops in peacetime. Even guesses about likely Soviet objectives in the event of hostilities can be factored in. However, there are no Soviet maps (nor any other data) which delineate the high commands' areas of operation. Soviet military geography is of limited utility in discussing current Soviet C³ developments.

An important source of information on Soviet high commands is the December 1984 obituary for Defense Minister Ustinov,[2] although even this source does not provide much information (see figure). However, the obituary can be interpreted fairly reliably using Soviet analysis to indicate the existence of the high commands, their probable general location, and the identities of the **glavkoms** or **CINCs** and their political deputies.

The list of signatories to this obituary, arranged in clear hierarchical ranking, indicated (for the first and only time to date) four theater-level commanders and their respective **zampolits** (political deputies), all of whom signed ahead of the list of military district commanders. Identified were Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Gen. I.A. Gerasimov, Gen. Yu.P. Maksimov, and Gen. I.M. Tret'yak. These were CINCs of the four currently established high commands of strategic directions (or in the case of Tret'yak's command, high command of forces in the Far East). Since the Ustinov obituary, no further theater-level commands have been identified, though there has been a single personnel shift involv-

Terminology

The central concept in discussing current Soviet wartime C³ architecture is high command (*glavnoye kommandovaniye*). The heads of these high commands, Marshal Ogarkov et al, are commanders-in-chief (*glavnokommanduyushchii* or simply *glavkoms*).

The high commands are intermediate levels of command and control between the wartime supreme high command and fronts; they would control multiple fronts. Defining the high commands as "high commands of multiple fronts" is rather generic, however, and a more specific designation is called for. In the Far East, the Soviets call the command the High Command of Forces in the Far East, but what of the other high commands?

The Soviets define high command as "organ of strategic control . . . in strategic directions or within the boundaries of a theater of military actions." There appear to be two fairly equivalent terms for referring to the high commands; High Command in the Western TVD or High Command in the Western Strategic Direction. However, from the standpoint of terminology developed in Soviet doctrinal writings, the term high command in a strategic direction should be preferred over usages involving TVD. A strategic direction is defined by the very forces which the high command controls, whereas a TVD is a territory which may contain forces not committed to the high command (or possibly no forces at all).

ing a *glavkom*. In 1985, Maksimov became CINC, Strategic Rocket Forces and he was replaced by the former GSFG commander, Gen. M.M. Zaytsev.[3]

Though the information provided by the Ustinov obituary is limited, it at least provides a baseline for analysis of the high commands issue, a baseline against which speculation on troop control developments must be tested.

There is no evidence identifying any *glavkoms* other than these four, or any other high commands. However, some analysts contend that there are additional high commands, for example, a high command in the northwest TVD or a second level of interpolated command between VGK and the high commands of strategic directions (so-called theater of war commands).

This stems from what may be called the geographic fallacy, the idea that military geography drives troop control developments. Analysis exemplifying this fallacy is embodied in **Soviet Organization for Theater War**, in which the author devises a command schema based on his reading of Soviet military geography. Starting with correct assumptions that the Soviets are creating intermediate command entities among fronts and the Supreme High Command (VGK) and that Soviet military art distinguishes between theaters of war (TVs) and theaters of military actions (TVDs), the article draws what might be a logical conclusion: The Soviets have created TVD commands subordinate to TV commands in four theaters of war. This analysis then posits two command echelons between the front and the VGK, and approximately eight theater-level commands. Reality, as the Soviets might say, refutes this notion.[4]

Actually, the broad lines of the high command issue are not difficult to ascertain. Soviet doctrinal writings on troop control issues, the Soviet World War II C^3 experience, and the Ustinov obituary conveniently confirmed the establishment of the high commands that doctrine and history indicate should exist. From the identities of the *glavkoms*, it is reasonable to conjecture the likely geographic areas of responsibility for the high commands. For example, Gerasimov, CINC of the Southwest Strategic Direction, had previously been thought dual-hatted, with wartime responsibilities for the Southwest Direction.

Soviet military doctrine generates C^3 requirements, as well as technical requirements in the form of new hardware. The principal impetus to the development of high commands is a central Soviet military doctrinal construct: As warfare becomes more complex (technology and military art advance), operational and strategic objectives gain depth. The depth of operation correlates to the complexity and size of the combat formations which pursue the strategic objective. This has been described by Erickson as the doctrine-technology-organization sequence.[5] In essence, this relationship may be stated: technology entails organization.

According to the Soviet reading of military history, an important progression can be seen in the increasing size of combat groupings and formations and the complexity of combat operations (division operations beginning in the 18th Century, army operations in the 19th Century and front operations during World War I).

In World War II, the Soviets were confronted with the necessity of carrying on operations with groups of fronts. Forced to innovate a satisfactory method of troop control to conduct strategic defensive and offensive operations, the Soviets experimented with high commands of strategic directions in 1941-42, the use of VGK representatives at field headquarters, direct VGK control, and the use of ad hoc CINCs for individual operations. In view of the personality of the Supreme Commander of Soviet Forces during the war, Stalin, and the fact that much of the military leadership had been eliminated in the 1937-38 purge, it is not surprising that Soviet troop control during the Great Patriotic War had a tentative quality to it.

The Soviet experience with troop control in World War II may suggest some of the issues that the current high commands address. It would be wrong, however, to see the current commands as lineal descendants of the World War II high commands. For one thing, the current command structure must accommodate, in the west, Warsaw Pact armies and be prepared in some cases to wage coalition warfare.

More importantly, there is a specific component of Soviet operational art that gives impetus to the development of the high commands (shaped and conditioned by the technical and organizational reality of

The high commands established during 1941-42, which are often cited as antecedents of the current C^3 developments, were in fact called high commands of forces of a direction.

Both theater of military action (TVD, *teatr voyennikh deystvii)* and *strategic direction* are geographic terms. Too much ink has been expended in discussing the term TVD, its meaning and its English translation. While it is true that the Soviets distinguish between TVD and simply *teatr voini* (theater of war), for simplicity's sake TVD can be understood as roughly equivalent to the Western notions of "theater." The difference is that the Soviets have carved up the globe into a number of territories and given each a name; Western TVD, African TVD, etc. A TVD is a territory with mutable but relatively fixed boundaries.

A strategic direction (*strategicheskoye napravleyniye*) is a part of a TVD (. . . chast TVD) in which major forces are committed in pursuit of operational-strategic goals. Although a geographic concept, a strategic direction is not a fixed territory, but rather an axis or sector (alternative translations of *napravleyniye*) defined by the forces committed in that sector and its strategic objectives.

Source: **Voyennii Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar** (Moscow: Military Press 1983), s.v. "glavnoye kommandovaniye voysk napravleyniya," "strategicheskoye napravleyniye," pp. 194, 195, 711.

modern combat): the strategic operation in a strategic direction or TVD. As the Soviets see it, the requirement for higher forms of troop control corresponds with the technical improvements in hardware and cybernetics which make such strategic operations feasible.

Ogarkov has discussed the current troop control problem in terms of the doctrinal construct which equates depth of strategic operations with complexity of combat groupings and formations. In **History Teaches Vigilance**, he wrote, "It is customary to no longer view as basic the frontal operation, or even the operation of a group of fronts, but a more modern, perfected and large-scale form; the operation in a TVD."[6]

In addition to meeting the requirements levied by doctrinal developments, the realization of the new high commands is compatible with other C^3 principles such as redundancy. Thus, the Soviets gain adventitious benefits from the establishment of the high commands of strategic directions in peacetime such as the increased survivability gained from additional, pre-established, theater-strategic command posts. Next, with the establishment of the high commands, strategic command and control moves geographically closer to the front-line troops, which assists in battle management. Finally, the Soviets should reap a number of benefits such as better exercise play, better coordination among combat formations, and improved planning from the establishment of permanent headquarter elements in peacetime that will provide strategic direction in wartime.

From the Western perspective, what is the significance of the peacetime establishment of high commands? Certainly, they must be assessed for their potential value to the Soviets in wartime. For the purpose of argument, the range of possible assessment can be suggested by a minimalist and a maximalist view.

A minimalist view holds that they count for very little, that they are merely an extra command echelon, an additional military bureaucracy inserted into the current C^3 architecture. According to this view, what will matter in wartime will be the quality of the weapons, the force ratio and the morale and preparedness of the troops, not whether the front commander receives his orders from a high command *stavka* in theater versus the VGK *stavka* in Moscow. However, even taking the minimalist view, command post redundancy and the other adventitious benefits such as improved pre-hostility coordination aid the Soviets in the establishment of high commands in peacetime.

The maximalist view, which must be very close to the Soviets' own, sees troop control developments as a key variable in a number of propositions which are generated by the axiom, "The correct military doctrine wins the war." In abbreviated form, this line of reasoning follows: Military arts must march along with military-technical advancements. The technical conditions of modern warfare imply that strategic operations will be conducted at great depth and by a group of fronts in a strategic direction or in a TVD, and the high commands are, according to the Soviet view, the most suitable form of troop control for combat operations under present conditions. Thus, if operations in the strategic direction are successful, the high commands may be assessed as instrumental in achieving success for Warsaw Pact armies in a future conflict with the West.

In assessing the significance of the high commands, it is possible to be skeptical of the claims of Soviet military dialectics while recognizing the impressive scope of Soviet military planning and forecasting and its potential value in Soviet preparations for future conflicts. Some analysts such as Hines and Petersen, see in the development of high commands an object lesson in the relative seriousness and vitality of Soviet long range planning as opposed to our own. The significance of the establishment of the high commands during the short term may be that it clearly reaffirms that the Soviets are serious about applying real world solutions mandated by the evolution in their military doctrine. ★

Marshal N. V. Ogarkov
glavkom, Western Strategic Direction

The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Mr. John Lyons for his invaluable assistance in the research of this article.

Footnotes

1. Addressed in this article is: Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr., "Soviet Organization for Theater War," ***Military Intelligence***, Vol. 11, No. 4, October-December 1985, pp. 24-32. For a more conventional view see: John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "Changing the Soviet System of Control," ***International Defense Review***, No. 3, 1986, pp. 281-293. For a more comprehensive look at the Ministry of Defense Apparatus, see: Ulrich-Joachim Schulz-Torge, "The Soviet Military High Command" (Parts 1 and 2), ***Military Technology***, August 1985, pp. 111-121 and September 1985, pp. 102-111.
2. ***Izvestiya***, December 22, 1984, p. 2.
3. General M.M. Zaytsev in his capacity as *glavkom*, Southern Strategic Direction, signed the obituary of V.N. Gryazanov who had been the First Deputy Commander, Caucasian Military District (***Kraznaya Zvezda***, March 21, 1986, p. 4). We can expect that *glavkoms* and other members of the high commands will be intermittently identified in obituaries of prominent military personalities. It is unlikely, however,

(Continued on page 54)

Obituary of Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov (*Izvestiya, p. 2, 22 December 1984*).

Маршал Советского Союза

Дмитрий Федорович УСТИНОВ

20 декабря 1984 года на 77-м году жизни, после тяжелой болезни скончался член Политбюро ЦК КПСС, министр обороны СССР, депутат Верховного Совета СССР, Герой Советского Союза, дважды Герой Социалистического Труда, Маршал Советского Союза Дмитрий Федорович Устинов. В его лице Коммунистическая партия и советский народ, Вооруженные Силы СССР потеряли видного деятеля КПСС и Советского государства.

Дмитрий Федорович Устинов прожил яркую, славную жизнь. По воле партии он возглавлял ответственные участки государственного строительства, народного хозяйства, занимал высокие посты в центральных органах партии и государства, был одним из крупных организаторов оборонной промышленности и руководителей Вооруженных Сил СССР. С его именем связано обеспечение Советской Армии и Флота вооружением и боевой техникой в годы Великой Отечественной войны, он внес значительный вклад в создание ракетной техники и в освоение космоса.

Д. Ф. Устинов родился в 1908 году в г. Самаре в семье рабочего. В 1922 году вступил добровольцем в Красную Армию. После службы в армии окончил профессионально-техническую школу, работал слесарем, машинистом-дизелистом в городах Балахна и Иваново. В 1927 году стал членом Коммунистической партии.

По окончании в 1934 году Ленинградского военно-механического института Д. Ф. Устинов работал инженером в научно-исследовательском институте, с 1937 года — инженером-конструктором, заместителем главного конструктора, а затем директором ленинградского завода «Большевик». Здесь проявился его талант конструктора и организатора производства.

В июне 1941 года Дмитрий Федорович Устинов был назначен народным комиссаром вооружения СССР. Возглавив освоение и массовое производство оружия в годы Великой Отечественной войны, он многое сделал для победы над гитлеровским фашизмом и японским милитаризмом.

С 1946 по 1957 год Д. Ф. Устинов — министр оборонной промышленности СССР. Затем он назначается заместителем Председателя Совета Министров СССР, а в марте 1963 года — первым заместителем Председателя Совета Министров СССР и председателем Высшего совета народного хозяйства СССР. В 1965 году Д. Ф. Устинов был избран секретарем ЦК КПСС.

На XIX, XX, XXII—XXVI съездах партии Дмитрий Федорович Устинов избирался членом Центрального Комитета КПСС. С 1965 по 1966 год он — кандидат в члены Президиума ЦК КПСС, с 1966 по 1976 год — кандидат в члены Политбюро ЦК КПСС. С 1976 года Дмитрий Федорович являлся членом Политбюро ЦК КПСС. Д. Ф. Устинов был депутатом Верховного Совета СССР 2, 4—11 созывов, депутатом Верховного Совета РСФСР 5, 7—10 созывов.

В апреле 1976 года Д. Ф. Устинов был назначен министром обороны СССР. На этом посту Маршал Советского Союза Д. Ф. Устинов твердо и неуклонно проводил в жизнь политику партии по обеспечению обороноспособности Советского государства. Ему принадлежит большая заслуга в повышении боевой готовности армии и флота, обучении и воспитании личного состава Вооруженных Сил. Д. Ф. Устинов активно укреплял боевое содружество Вооруженных Сил СССР с армиями государств — членов Варшавского Договора.

Возглавляя Министерство обороны СССР, он вел большую общественно-политическую работу, был тесно связан с трудовыми и воинскими коллективами, партийными организациями. Ему были присущи чувство нового, творческий подход к делу, умение организовать людей на решение больших и ответственных задач, что ярко проявилось в его деятельности по укреплению оборонного могущества нашей Родины. Высокая принципиальность, преданность делу партии, скромность и душевная отзывчивость снискали ему любовь и глубокое уважение советских людей. Он был для них примером беззаветного служения Родине, верности коммунистическим идеалам.

Большие заслуги Дмитрия Федоровича Устинова высоко оценены партией и государством. Он был удостоен звания Героя Советского Союза и дважды — Героя Социалистического Труда, награжден одиннадцатью орденами Ленина, орденом Суворова I степени, Кутузова I степени, медалями Советского Союза, а также высокими наградами многих государств. Он был лауреатом Ленинской и Государственных премий СССР.

Воины Вооруженных Сил СССР, все советские люди навсегда сохранят в своей памяти светлый образ коммуниста-ленинца, пламенного патриота и интернационалиста, выдающегося военачальника Дмитрия Федоровича Устинова.

К. У. Черненко, Г. А. Алиев, В. И. Воротников, М. С. Горбачев, В. В. Гришин, А. А. Громыко, Д. А. Кунаев, Г. В. Романов, М. С. Соломенцев, Н. А. Тихонов, В. В. Щербицкий, П. Н. Демичев, В. И. Долгих, В. В. Кузнецов, Б. Н. Пономарев, В. М. Чебриков, Э. А. Шеварднадзе, М. В. Зимянин, И. В. Капитонов, Е. К. Лигачев, К. В. Русаков, Н. И. Рыжков, Г. Ф. Сизов, И. В. Архипов, А. К. Антонов, Н. К. Байбаков, Г. И. Марчук, Л. В. Смирнов, С. Ф. Ахромеев, В. Г. Куликов, С. Л. Соколов, А. А. Епишев, Н. И. Савинкин, К. М. Боголюбов, И. Ф. Дмитриев, С. А. Афанасьев, Б. В. Бальмонт, Б. В. Бакин, В. В. Бахирев, И. С. Белоусов, О. Д. Бакланов, П. Ф. Ломако, Э. К. Первышин, П. С. Плешаков, И. С. Савьев, Е. П. Славский, П. В. Финогенов, А. И. Шокин, Б. П. Бугаев, М. С. Смирнов, А. П. Александров, Е. Ф. Муравьев, В. Ф. Толубко, В. Б. Бакланов, В. Е. Петров, А. И. Колдунов, А. Н. Ефимов, С. Г. Горшков, В. Д. Говоров, С. К. Куркоткин, В. М. Шабалов, И. Ф. Шестопалов, А. Т. Алтунин, И. Н. Шкадов, А. И. Сорокин, М. Д. Попков, П. А. Горячев, Л. Л. Щетинов, С. А. Бобылев, П. Н. Медведев, Н. В. Огарков, Е. П. Уткин, И. А. Герасимов, В. С. Родин, Ю. П. Максимов, А. И. Ширяпкин, И. М. Третьяк, М. И. Дружинин, П. Г. Лушев, И. П. Репин, М. М. Зайцев, А. Д. Лизичев, Д. Т. Язов, Н. Ф. Климов, С. И. Постников, В. М. Ломов, Н. И. Попов, И. А. Моисеев, В. А. Востров, В. Г. Самойленко, Н. Ф. Грачев, О. В. Зинченко, А. Я. Рятов, Г. А. Громов, Е. Ф. Ивановский, А. Н. Колесниченко, В. В. Осипов, В. Ф. Аралов, В. А. Беликов, Н. В. Гончаров, В. М. Архипов, В. Л. Гуделич, В. В. Скоков, Е. М. Ачалду, А. С. Елагин, В. Ф. Плеханов, В. Ф. Ермаков, Н. С. Коваленко, А. В. Ковтунов, И. М. Титов, К. А. Кочетов, А. И. Макунин, Б. В. Снятков, В. С. Нечаев, А. В. Бетехтин, В. П. Новиков, А. У. Константинов, В. А. Пономарев, А. П. Михайловский, Н. В. Усенко, Н. М. Калитаев, И. Ф. Аликов, А. М. Калинин, Р. Н. Лихошвин, В. В. Сидоров, А. М. Славский, С. И. Руденко, А. С. Желтов, И. В. Илларионов, С. С. Турунов, Н. П. Кудинов.

General I. A. Gerasimov glavkom, Southwest Strategic Direction

General M. M. Zaytsev glavkom, Southern Strategic Direction

General I. M. Tret'yak glavkom, Forces in the Far East

The 22 December 1984 obituary of Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov is still the primary open source which indicates the establishment of the four current **high commands** and the identification, as a group, of the four glavkoms or CINCs of high commands.

Obituaries are a prime source of information about the Soviet leadership since the Soviets use them to signal the descending order of leadership.

Following Ogarkov's September 1984 dismissal as Chief of the General Staff, his reduced position in the military-political hierarchy is graphically shown by the relative position of his signature and those of the new Chief of Staff, S. F. Akhromeyev and CINC, Combined Armed Forces, Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. G. Kulikov.

Figure 1

CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE MEETINGS

by Lt. Col. John H. Rinaldi

There are many definitions of a meeting, but two seem to say it all. "Meetings take place whenever two or more people . . . meet,"[1] and meetings are "gatherings of three to 20 people lasting 15 minutes or more."[2] Most of us have attended a multitude of meetings in our work and community. It is frustrating to leave a meeting which has not been properly conducted and discover that the purpose and a concrete resolution were not properly articulated. This is ineffective and causes problems for the attendees. A need exists to establish guidelines for conducting effective meetings. The purpose of this review is to create those guidelines based on my research of several references plus my personal observations and experiences in various military and community organizations.

The one thread of consistency in the conduct of effective meetings is time. Starting on time and using time effectively promote a good meeting. Some years ago, a good friend introduced me to Toastmasters International. In addition to improving one's speaking, learning and thinking abilities, Toastmasters instills timeliness in its members. Consider for a moment that when you keep people waiting you have, in effect, stolen time from them which is irreplaceable. Many other important factors are involved in effective meetings and vary according to experience and perspective. The prime factors, however, are: type, reason, agenda, people, place and support.

There are staff, personal, group and many other types of meetings. Committees and get-togethers are two categories. Committee meetings are normally held on a regular basis, have multiple subjects, are formalized and are conducted by a chairman. The get-together addresses a single issue and is informal, spontaneous and lacks clear objectives. Other types of meetings are process oriented and mission oriented. Process oriented meetings are held regularly and key on information exchange. One-on-one, staff and operation review are examples of the process oriented meeting. The mission oriented meeting must specify who will attend and who the chairman will be. This type of meeting is conducted to make decisions, give further guidance, and ascertain the status of various projects.

Reasons for meetings are varied, and an analysis should be conducted to determine your purpose and ultimate goal. Two questions to ask yourself are: "Is a meeting a substitute for action?" and, "Can I make the decision myself without others?"[3] Some reasons may be to gather or exchange information, to transact business, to socialize or to make money. One interesting concept is that of focusing on contribution. This stimulates reliance on others, thus creating a team effort, the result being, "To focus on contribution is to focus on effectiveness."[4] I have found that a regularly scheduled weekly staff meeting is essential for planning the week's activities, exchanging information, monitoring ongoing actions, and issuing tasks to staff personnel. Other meetings with a select group can be conducted on an as needed basis. Face-to-face contact is important, but some feel that one should have meetings only as a last resort. The telephone and use of conference calls can be substituted for meetings. I do not necessarily agree with this premise, but there are occasions when, for example, a conference call is useful and practical for cross-continent or overseas personnel within an organization.

Once you have decided the reason for your meeting, consider an agenda. Compile specific topics, stating a clear purpose for the meeting. If selected staff members are giving presentations, then allocate windows of time for each of them. This will maximize all the substantive data and will ensure the quality of time usage. A facilitator or chairman is important, as he must keep things on track. Firm but compassionate direction is the best advice I can suggest for this role. You want the attendees to be participants and contributors, but you must also control wanderers, storytellers and dominators. Have clear terms of reference, define the objectives, and ensure speakers adhere to an agenda. It is good practice to periodically summarize each issue that was discussed during a meeting. People will have a complete understanding of the outcome, especially if a decision was made. You want to encourage a free flow of information to avoid advanced decisions or a hardening of positions.

In regularly scheduled, i.e. weekly staff meetings, an agenda is probably not necessary. The chairman will set the procedures and after a few sessions your staff will know what is expected of them. You will find that, over a period of time, meetings be-

GUIDELINES

TYPE

- staff
- one-on-one
- brainstorming
- operation review
- decision making
- group
- committee
- information sharing

REASON

- gather information
- transact business
- plan activities
- problem solving
- review progress
- staff action status
- socialization

AGENDA

- written preferred
- state clear purpose
- adhere to it
- adequate time for presentation
- periodically summarize
- keep people informed
- watch interruptions
- always summarize at conclusion

PEOPLE

- key staff members
- involve everyone
- make people feel influential
- encourage dialogue

PLACE

- your office
- conference room
- subordinate's area
- neutral area
- out of office environment

SUPPORT

- stationery items, i.e. paper, pencils
- table & chairs
- audio/visual equipment
- refreshments

MEETING CHECKLIST

PRE-MEETING

- accumulate & review notes or topics for discussion
- reserve room if not pre-set, ensure proper space, lighting, ventilation
- have adequate table or work space and sufficient seating
- inform attendees of time, date, place if not pre-set
- inform attendees of changes in time, date, place
- if required, prepare & disseminate agenda
- have paper, pencils, and like items available
- audio/visual aids (ensure operational)
- decorative items on table
- refreshments

THE MEETING

- start on time
- conduct business at a table
- review agenda & items from previous meeting
- take notes
- stick to business (watch interruptions)
- accept no phone calls unless critical
- encourage comments & questions
- provide leadership opportunities
- stay in control
- periodically summarize issues
- summarize key points at end of meeting
- set time, date, place for next meeting if not pre-set

POST-MEETING

- clean-up room
- review any written input
- disseminate written results to staff
- include tasking in results
- prepare memos as required
- send results to non-attendees who are affected
- begin planning for next meeting

come shorter, but more substantive information will be presented. I conduct weekly staff meetings at 8:00 a.m. every Monday. Our workday begins at staggered times, and by 8:00 a.m. those who are required to attend have had sufficient time to organize themselves and prepare for our meeting. I always present my information and tasking items last. This gives my staff the opportunity to advise me on the status of projects and actions before I surface them. With this regular "agenda," I have noticed the length of meetings is cut in half. Productivity and organizational effectiveness have also increased considerably. When the agenda for a meeting is finished, summarize the highlights and send a memorandum to those who attended and copies to other interested people. This is the final touch. Everyone will understand what occurred, what decisions were made, and what further actions may be required.

The choice of attendees must be decided by the chairman; all subordinates need not attend. Remember the time and expense of your people. If you are organized with division chiefs, then it is not wise to invite section chiefs. Let the division chiefs disseminate the information to their section chiefs. It promotes responsibility, does not waste time, precludes micro-managing and filters the information properly throughout your organization. Another technique is to provide written results of the meeting to others who may be affected or have a particular interest in it. For example, if your meeting was conducted with your supply officer, inform your budget officer of the meeting and provide him with the results. Keep people informed and disseminate information thoroughly.

An effective meeting must be free from interruptions. Determining the location of your meeting is almost as important as selecting the attendees. Meetings can be held virtually anywhere. Conducting a meeting away from the office environment on occasion may promote creativity. You do need adequate space, seating and privacy. The conference room is designed for meetings and should be used. Access for you and staff members is an important consideration. If you have a suitable office it may be used, but do join together at a separate table instead of conducting a meeting from behind your desk. This creates feelings of intimidation and physically separates you from your staff which destroys the team concept. For a while I conducted meetings both ways and found that sitting together around a table created better participation, increased efficiency and decreased the time required to conduct meetings. If you are conducting a one-on-one meeting, have it in your subordinate's work area. Let your subordinate organize it and keep to a schedule; it will provide for a good exchange of information. After all, your subordinate will have his normal materials and reference items readily available. One-on-one meetings for counseling or sensitive purposes are probably best held in your own office.

Support for an effective meeting encompasses a multitude of items from a basic pencil to the meeting place itself. In regularly scheduled meetings, attendees should bring their own writing utensils. Consider other types of meetings where you may want to provide stationery items. A table with ample room at which to sit and take notes is a must. How many times have you been invited to a meeting only to sit on a chair, balance your notebook on your lap, and stow reference material on the floor? This is distracting and unprofessional. A round table is the best setting. It creates an atmosphere of equality and promotes good eye contact. If you use a rectangular table, position yourself in the middle as the chairman. The traditional place at the head may be intimidating to some, especially if you have more than six people at your meeting. Consider softening the effect of a meeting with decorative items on the table, such as flowers or a small organizational award. Have coffee or other refreshments available in the same room. Encourage people to leave the table for refreshments during the meeting and you can avoid that five minute break which usually turns into 15. Here again, time can be a factor for all attendees. Use visual aids when appropriate, and those giving presentations should ensure that the visual aid equipment works properly.

Management experts and business executives seem to agree on certain factors which make a meeting effective. Timeliness, physical layout of the meeting place, and agenda are a few of these factors. I recommend the presented guideline be used for the overall preparation and conduct of an effective meeting. With this proposal, a generic checklist for three types of common meetings is required. Such a checklist has been developed for staff, one-on-one and brainstorming meetings. ★

Footnotes

1. G. Holland, **Running a Business Meeting** (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1984), p. 4.
2. W. Fletcher, **Meetings, Meetings—How to Manipulate Them and Make Them More Fun** (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), p. 23.
3. E.C. Bliss, **Getting Things Done—The ABC's of Time Management** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), p. 57.
4. P.F. Drucker, **The Effective Executive** (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), p. 70.

Lt. Col. John H. Rinaldi is currently serving as commander, U.S. Army Special Security Command, WESTCOM, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. He earned a bachelor's degree in Spanish from St. Peter's College and a master's degree in business administration from the Univ. of Utah. Rinaldi is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. Previously, he was assigned to the J-2 Directorate, U.S. Southern Command, Republic of Panama, where he served as chief, Contingency Production Support Division.

Enhanced Symbols

by Maj. Larry A. Altersitz

You are the G-2 of the 52nd Mechanized Division. The commanding general wants the current status of the enemy forces. Your division has been on the line for 17 hours and has sustained approximately a 42 percent loss of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and 18 percent casualties. The enemy CAA has obviously taken some losses in this attack. How do you give the commanding general and his staff the current intelligence situation?

You have two choices: verbally or graphically. The verbal presentation flows as follows: "Sir, the enemy has the 61st, 89th and 112th GMRDs on line against us, with the 179th GMRD and the 53rd GTD as second echelon elements of the 31st CAA. The enemy losses exceed 700 AFVs, over 90 artillery pieces, dozens of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft" and so on. This doesn't elude to certain vital information, such as surviving effective enemy combat elements, trafficking problems, etc., that the staff must consider in planning counterattacks. Current graphics aren't much better because they don't provide enough information about the enemy. The analyst can portray a battalion or regiment of BMPs as ineffective or annihilated by placing an "X" through the symbol, but to do so is misleading. What happened to the survivors?

I propose we consider using our present graphics, but enhance them to show more relevant details for a commander. This would allow us to use known symbols on the new electronic display maps that are, hopefully, going to be used in an automated battlefield intelligence system. We need a methodology that will allow us to graphically tell a commander and staff certain key data: how many effective combat units remain in a given organization without going into the minutiae that will bog them down.

Let's start with four basic immutable laws:

1. No plan survives contact with the enemy. (Von Moltke)
2. Things will go wrong no matter how much you plan. (Murphy)
3. Machines will malfunction, usually at inconvenient times. (Murphy)
4. One picture is worth a thousand words. (Chinese proverb)

How do these statements relate to the problem at hand? Let's start with law 4. When we look at a symbol for a unit of any army, the symbol should carry certain information and concepts: size, vehicles, equipment, capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, strengths. Each one of us will not know what every symbol means, but we should be familiar with the basic combat formation symbols of the enemy we are facing. In the Army, we use three augmenting markings for our units. An (∩) over the company or battalion symbol indicates a task force or company team of mixed armor and infantry, (+) depicts a unit that is reinforced with at least one major sub-unit, and (-) tells us that a unit has detached or lost a major sub-unit. These serve our internal needs adequately, but not our external intelligence requirements.

Laws 1, 2 and 3 basically make the same statement. It is utterly unrealistic to expect your enemy to have fewer problems than you do with machine breakdowns or human errors. Yes, he would love to make an attack at 110% strength and all vehicles "in the green." But if he has to drive that equipment 15 km, he is going to have a problem somewhere. Our symbolism should reflect that our enemy suffers losses, too.

This discussion is aimed at Soviet-style forces, but is adaptable to any other style you need to template. It will work best when we have automated reporting systems using burst transmissions from company to battalion to brigade/division for operational, real-time data. These systems should allow for a commander to fill in the blanks on a computer screen format and forward that data without the cumbersome "Line Alpha, 12; Line Bravo, 2" system of voice transmission. The field artillery has the Digital Message Devices now. A "lap top" size computer mounted in an AFV could use the new 256K ROM and RAM chips to format and collect the data from sub-elements by automatically polling the sub-units when queried from higher headquarters via a data radio channel. The commander's vehicle could task subordinate vehicles on a data channel, and the subordinate vehicles could have mi-

croprocessors that collect admin/log and ops/intel information. The ops/intel data would have to be entered manually, unless a voice recognition system is used. A voice system that could separate data based on built-in parameters, such as "Tank, destroyed" or "T-72, dead," from the commander or gunner would save time and free vehicle commanders from the demands of reporting during a battle. Combine the sight/voice system with a position locating system. The data can be used to fill in the blanks on axes of movement. As reports of enemy losses accumulate at S-2/G-2 sections, a defender eventually will no longer be facing a battalion, but rather two companies and some support elements. How we transmit that information both ways is a critical intelligence function I hope might be resolved by this system.

My proposed system is based on certain assumptions. Any combat unit is at "full strength" when it has between 80 percent and 110 percent of its men and primary equipment (usually combat, i.e. tanks, BMPs, howitzers, etc.) available for duty. If it meets that criterion, it is depicted by the standard symbol for the unit's size and type. If it has between 60 percent and 80 percent of its combat power, it receives a (-), with combat power defined as the unit's primary weapon system and manpower. Forty percent to 60 percent is shown by an (=); less than 40 percent rates an (*). If no combat vehicles remain, (x) is the marking. If the unit were between 110 percent and 125 percent strength, adding an extra combat sub-element, use the standard (+). In effect, a unit is no longer what it was symbolically depicted when the fighting started. Perhaps an example might work better.

The 42nd MRR has the following structure (FM 100-2-3, 1984): figure 1.

The 42nd is the BMP-equipped regiment of the 61st GMRD. The 42nd is a first echelon regiment in the scenario, and the 61st is the center division of the 13th CAA first echelon attack. The 61st (MO10920/80-(HB 550-2)) is depicted in figure 2.

The 61st's commanding general sends his reconnaissance battalion out across his division front along with the 42nd's recon company to gather intelligence at the start of hostilities. Because our CFA troops were trained to kill the enemy recon elements as soon as located, both units were destroyed early in the battle. The 42nd crossed the line with 1/42 and 2/42 in the first echelon; 3/42 followed 1/42, and 42 TB (the regiment's organic tank battalion) followed 2/42. The organic 122mm howitzer battalion (42 HB) is following the rear battalions; it has detached a battery to each of the first echelon MRBs; a second 122mm howitzer battalion has been allocated to the regiment from the 61st's division artillery group to form a regimental artillery group for the 42nd (42 RAG). The regimental advance guard had 1/42's A Company and the first platoon from A/42 tank battalion (A/42 TB). The rest of the A/42 TB followed the advance guard. Each battalion's 120mm mortar battery is used to support its advance guard and is positioned near the advance guard MRC. The automatic grenade launcher platoon of each MRB would probably be forward to protect the flanks of the advance guard without having to tie up heavier vehicles. The 42nd's anti-tank battery would probably support the main attack and be attached to 1/42 or the advance guard. A defending commander would really like to see the following on his map/display: See figure 3.

The templating would reflect the approximate distances between enemy units so that subordinate commanders would have a good idea of what to expect. Now, on to the fray.

The lead MR platoon of A/1/42 is destroyed by 25mm cannon fire; the anti-tank battery and 1/A/42 TB attempt to engage the defenders with direct fire weapons and the mortar battery employs smoke to screen the advance. U.S. artillery fire destroys a mortar platoon and a pair of TOWs kill two tanks. A/1/42 crashes into the kill zone as 42 RAG places suppressive fires on the reported defender's positions. A/1/42 quickly loses five vehicles and attempts to set up a base of fire for the rest of 1/42 and A/42 TB to destroy the defenders and push forward. An M-2 is lost to hostile fire, but the fire team escapes. The anti-

Figure 1

Figure 2

tank battery is destroyed by a salvo of heavy mortar rounds from the defenders. My theoretical display would show this graphic, but not the parenthetical notations. Those would be generated for the S-2/G-2 data base and could be displayed on a "window" that listed all vehicles and weapons for any unit and kept an updated log of enemy losses. See figure 4.

The obstacle report would show this graphic. This report would only be used on a 1/50,000 or less map and use an "O" to show a destroyed vehicle, and an "X" to show any other type of wreckage, e.g., helicopters, towed artillery pieces, trucks, missile/rocket tractor-elevator-launchers, etc. If the number of obstacles reached a specific density set by the commander or G-3, it would show on 1/12,500 or greater map displays as a large dot, much the same way a map depicts an urban area. See figure 5.

As more vehicles enter the kill zone in front of the BP, the defenders use more assets to reduce the 1/42. As the survivors attempt to maneuver around the destroyed equipment, they encounter minefields. In less than 10 minutes from initial contact, the report to higher headquarters would look like figure 6.

The 2/42 was badly reduced by minefields and an M1A1 platoon that

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

destroyed its advance guard MR and TC platoons. As the remainder of 2/42 attempted to fight past the A1s, an MLRS salvo of twelve rockets scattered over 8,000 bomblets on the march columns. When the explosions stopped, 2/42 was graphically depicted as:

and the obstacle report spotted over three dozen burning vehicles. On the division and higher displays 42 MRR would be represented as:

This graphic would denote, to a person familiar with the 42 MRR, that it had lost at least one motorized rifle battalion. My enhanced symbols are designed to address the major sub-elements of a unit and will talk specifically to the preponderant type of sub-element in that unit. In this case, we are referring to an MRR, which means a loss of at least one MRB. Brigade and battalion commanders would want to know other losses that immediately affect their forces, but division could address regiments and separate battalions as lowest level of interest.

As 3/42 was in march column, another MLRS launcher fired six rockets on it and the remaining six on 42 TB. Regimental headquarters was near the front of 3/42, off to one side. That salvo stopped the 19 BMPs, 14 T-80s and five vehicles in the regimental headquarters. Counter-battery fire from defending artillery surprised the remaining battery of 42 HB and most of the guns in 42 RAG. The batteries attached to 1/42 and 2/42 were badly reduced by direct and indirect fires from the defending task force. As the reports flashed up the chain of command, the graphic for 42 MRR was shown as:

at division and higher headquarters, which told commanders and staffs that at least two of the three MRBs were no longer effective fighting forces. The (?) by the Regimental CP symbol showed that damage was noted, but no specific assessment was available. The complete graphic of the major combat units of the 42 MRR at lower levels would look like figure 7.

It is doubtful that the regimental commander would attempt to merge the survivors of 1/42 and 3/42 under one headquarters and have them continue as more than separate companies. Reorganization and reconstitution while on the march and under fire may be a step beyond any army's capabilities.

Depending on the total losses for the 61 GMRD, the division graphic would display either a (-) for the basic loss of the 42 MRR or (=), if the remainder of the MRRs had been reduced as badly. I would keep the division graphic only on a corps or army-level map display. The true picture is shown at the MRR/TR level.

The system cannot tell you how many soldiers are left as "effectives." Unless an observer signals "no movement" after a firefight, that could be an imponderable. If you assume that half the mounted soldiers survive a vehicle's destruction, they are reduced to foot soldiers without transportation and, perhaps, no leaders. Even if they play "tank riders" fragmentation and small arms fires will reduce those numbers fast.

The system is aimed at reducing the problem of seeing our own shortages and failures as they really are, and ascribing an unrealistically high rate of survival or attrition to the enemy. The parenthetical numbers can be used in continuous IPB; if the reports show that nearly all the combat vehicles in an MRR have been destroyed, but there are still more coming, then logic would dictate that perhaps a 2nd echelon unit has committed its forces, the initial identification of the unit was wrong, or you may be on a boundary between units.

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SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence; tactical and strategic intelligence; organization; weapons and equipment; foreign forces; electronic warfare; and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, ect.). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: **Military Intelligence** prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the readers' attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the readers' time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

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If you are interested in a subject, chances are that others will be too. Pick a subject, thoroughly research it, and think all your ideas through. Write with enthusiasm, but be natural. Don't adopt a different style.

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Figure 6

Figure 7

As additional data comes in from other sources (SLAR, SOTAS, air reconnaissance, moving target radar, RPVs, LRRPs, etc.), it should be compared to your internally generated data. Your job as the G-2/S-2 is to present the commander and staff with the best possible data and your best interpretation of that data.

The "window" for tracking enemy losses would resemble a spread sheet with weapons, vehicles and equipment by type on the vertical axis and units by company/battalion/regiment on the horizontal axis. The running total of the largest unit in the horizontal axis would be kept in the last column on the right and would be compared to the known starting figures in a split box, i.e., losses/starting number. The unit on the line above any unit would be the organization to which the lower unit was assigned or attached. The division and higher

echelons are shown only as examples; they would only be displayed on corps or army-level maps. The enhanced symbols could be used to mark unit columns as depicted in figure 8.

The unit level displays in the intelligence chain will vary in size and coverage. At battalion level, a 1/5,000 to 1/12,500 scale display may be all that a commander and staff need. The smaller scales can show obstacles in greater detail for the commanders who have to live with them. A 1/25,000 or 1/50,000 display will show the "big picture" to brigade/division/corps planners for their levels of interest. At division/corps/army, the integration of the combat information and higher level intelligence will occur to give the fighting commanders a better picture of the battlefield. By mating the intelligence net with the numerous combat multiplier data bases, the fused picture can be displayed from the G-3 plans group to develop the offensive plans for the units involved. Remember "Gung Ho," not the magazine or the adjective, but the original Chinese meaning: *working together*. The data is integrated by the intelligence section, and plans group applies that data to the situation.

We have some unique opportunities to make a quantum leap in our data management systems. If we plan now, with new technologies, to convert data into usable intelligence for non-MI professionals, commanders and staffs will greatly appreciate the time and options given to them. They can use that data to bring about the successful completion of the mission with minimum loss of friendly manpower, equipment and collateral damage. ★



Figure 8

Maj. Larry A. Altersitz, FA, NJARNG, is a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, Airborne and Ranger Schools and has completed the Special Combined Arms Training Course in Armor. He has served at Fort Hood, in Vietnam and at Fort Leonard Wood while on active duty. As a Guardsman, he has served with the 26th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the 50th Armored Division. He has been published in ***Field Artillery Journal, Infantry, Armor, ARMY*** *and* ***Armed Forces Journal****. He is currently an industrial security specialist with the Defense Investigative Service, Mid-Atlantic Region, Cherry Hill, N.J., and director of administration for the New Jersey Military Academy.*

The FBI National Academy

by CW0 2 Russell E. Swift

Every year military services send personnel to the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy (FBI NA). The Air Force, Navy and Marines send security and law enforcement personnel, while the Army selects personnel from the Military Police and Military Intelligence branches. Attendance at the FBI NA is a unique experience which is both personally satisfying and professionally rewarding.

The FBI NA is located in Quantico, Va., on the Quantico Marine Corps Base. It is a modern, state-of-the-art training facility which consists of a first class cafeteria and gymnasium, classrooms, auditorium, scientific and photographic laboratories, library, firing ranges, and hotel-style dormitories.

An NA session lasts 11 weeks, with four sessions per year. Students are drawn from the law enforcement agencies of virtually every state, the U.S. territories, the military departments and several foreign country law enforcement agencies. The goal of the FBI NA is to provide training and improve the professional standard of the law enforcement and criminal justice profession. Incorporated in 1935, the FBI NA has graduated over 19,500 law enforcement professionals. The FBI NA is dedicated to the principle that continuing education is the hallmark of modern day law enforcement professionals.

Instruction is provided by experienced FBI Special Agents. College credits are offered by the Univ. of Virginia. Expert guest speakers are provided throughout the training. The goal of leadership development is accomplished through programs of instruction in five basic areas: forensic science, education-communication arts, management science, behavioral science and constitutional law. Physical training is required and firearms training is available. A wide variety of courses and electives is available to meet all interests and educational levels.

The NA places emphasis on developing leadership qualities for eventual top executive positions. Courses in management concepts and theories, organizational development, budgeting, electronic data processing, problem solving and decision making prepare students for more responsibility and executive command level positions. Courses in the areas of psychology, sociology, criminology and political science are intended to improve the understanding of human behavior and the factors which influence individuals and organizations. In the area of law, investigation techniques, arrests, search and seizure, evidence, confessions, interviewing and civil liabilities are addressed by expert instructors and guest speakers.

The areas of education and communication stress effective communication and instructional technology from an organizational and administrative standpoint. The science and technology of evidence collection and preservation are featured in the forensic science block. This executive developmental oriented training is rounded off with instructional segments in the more physical areas, such as defensive tactics, anti-sniper and survival training, and bombing/sabotage problems. Training is provided in the area of terrorism and terrorist psychology/philosophy.

Graduates of the NA become members of the National Academy Association (NAA). Being a member includes continuing training opportunities, monthly issues of the local NA chapter newsletter and the FBI law enforcement bulletin, and membership in the world's largest professional law enforcement organization.

An NA graduate will certainly be well prepared for the higher level command positions which require more effective management skills. More information on training at the FBI NA may be obtained by contacting: Commander, USAINSCOM, ATTN: IAOPS-TNG-T, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va., 22212. ★

CRYPTO CORNER

by Walter B. Howe

The cryptograms below are three consecutive sentences from a description of a battle by a well-known non-fiction author. The first sentence is divided into proper word lengths, and is encrypted by a simple substitution system. The second sentence is divided into five letter groups, and uses the same cipher alphabet, but at a new alinement of the plaintext and ciphertext letter sequences. The third sentence is based on the name of the battle, and after as many alphabets have been used as in the name of the battle, the series repeats until the end of the sentence is reached. The various keys used spell out the first and last names of the author as well as the name of the battle. The puzzle can be solved by logic without much knowledge of the techniques of cryptanalysis.

Sentence 1:

XT TWWS XT VIH UQGH YHRXS VW TBXZAHS XSC VIH
XVVXZA IXC YHHS GHEJBTHC, X RHSHGXB XGGQKHC
XV X RXBBWE PQVI QSTVXSV WGCHGT VW DWJSV XSC
XCKXSZH.

Sentence 2:

STWQX ESTKW UVWLU RXKJV GKYHJ XTVQU JUEXK TWUHY
THWJX WWSTI XKWXR WLUPU JSZYS TYVXK WLUJD OHSJU
CWSXT.

Sentence 3:

OC TPWYOXYX MTMEF ANJ ASDVKA SZ TOKOW
QFEHUVA, WQZ ZDSL EJG WRGMJL ADDL PTM KOPGCO
FQ TRC MHSIY CYMEF BK DTJYXTEL MNQH FSO GVQS
BGZ WNQJ, EJG SRIDWJAL ELJ XSLYP, EYCOJN WZCTEZ
GS PNG KU LJYJI TISKA TMTJ.

Solution on page 52

The Military Arts Essay

by W. K. Sanderson

The word *strategy* has taken on so many meanings, that it more frequently tends to be without any. Often the use of the word demands meaning from the context in which it is used, rather than contributing to it. For example, the *strategy* in strategic bomber may imply big, long range, command or important. Only when the context of the word is known, can the intended inference be made. The meaning of the word becomes more difficult to discern when it is used as a part of the continuum: strategy to tactics. Some type of scale is inferred such as: command level or importance, planning to implementation, or broad to narrow view of a situation. When *strategy* is used as a synonym for small scale, a geographic error is made. The word strategy has no intrinsic quality of size. The error lead me—a military geographer—to look more carefully at *strategy*. In so doing, I discovered the meaning of the word is a muddle. The search had three parts.

Initially, I considered the definition of strategy. *The Pocket Oxford Dictionary* defines strategy as: " . . . the art of war especially the part of it concerned with the conduct of campaigns, choice of operations to be attempted, and getting the forces into favorable positions for attempting them."

Such a definition includes in the meaning of strategy, questions of policy through logistics. A more particular meaning was expected. Noteworthy, however, is the first phrase: that strategy is an art.

The official definition of the Department of Defense is even more wanting in particulars: "the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

The Department also defines national strategy and military strategy, both of which are arts and sciences. It is difficult to isolate a phenomenon or action not included in such a definition, which may be a cause of the meaningless use of the word.

Next, I considered the origin of the word. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* relates the words *strategem* (artiface to surprise an enemy, device, trick), *strategos* (commander-in-chief), and *stratos* (army,lead). Before the mass armies of Frederick's Prussia and Napoleon's France, a commanding general had practically no staff, but directed the battle alone. Then, the etymological inferences of strategy were sufficient. To say that strategy was what generals did, was an adequate definition. But armies have changed a great deal, as has the doctrine and role of commanders. I therefore find the definition associated with leadership, appointment and deception to be unsatisfactory.

Finally, I searched to find a definition of strategy in some of the literature which employed the word. I hoped to find a consensus in use. Tolstoy summarized the results. "As is always the case," Tolstoy wrote of the use of another word, "the more cloudy and confused the conception conveyed by a word, with greater aplomb and self-assurance do people use the word, pretending that what is understood by it is so simple and clear that it is not even worth while to discuss what it actually means."

So many writings use the word *strategy* or a translation of it, that the choice of which to mention is arbitrary. Nevertheless, the tabulation on the following page illustrates the variety of meanings associated with this art of war.

Collectively, the sample uses can in no way be inferred to provide a common meaning to the word. The context has to be relied upon for the correct one. Tashjean's discussion of "strategic ethnocentrism"—neither term defined—caused me to take a more academic approach to defining strategy. His discussion of Eastern versus Western military philosophies made me look again at the notion I had taken for granted: the notion of tactics and strategy being military arts. It seems inconsistent to call Alexander the Great and others great strategists while allowing a weapon to be strategic as well. Surely *strategy* has more profundity. I therefore searched for a definition of the word *art*. In so doing, I discovered a reason for the military arts being ill defined. *Art* is a word equally lacking in meaning, as Tolstoy wrote about in the quotation above.

It took Tolstoy, a reputable writer, over fifteen years to define the word *art* satisfactorily. His opinion is therefore worth consideration: "Art is an activity by means of which one man, having experienced a feeling, intentionally transmits it to others. To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced and having evoked it in oneself then by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience the same feeling—that is the activity of art. Art is differentiated from the activity of the understanding, which demands preparation and a certain sequence of knowledge . . . , by the fact that it acts on people independently of their state of development or education."

I do not accept all of Tolstoy's definition because, to my chagrin, he went on to ally art with religion. Nevertheless, the essence of art is, I think, described adequately. Art is something more fundamental than ill-defined beauty: it is feeling transmitted. With Tolstoy's definition in mind, I next considered the phrase "military art."

Military art must have feeling associated with it, much as beauty is associated with painting. The selection of any one feeling, from many associated with military undertakings, is to me a subjective one. Upon this basis, I believe that confidence is the feeling of military arts which is to be transmitted. The military

artist devises a way to defeat the enemy; he creates a plan. The plan is the medium and the art is to be found in the insight that leads to such an expression as "aha!" at having solved a puzzle. There must be an emotion of self-confidence generated by the artist within himself. The perception of the plan must create a similar confidence in and by men who believe they can and will defeat the enemy by carrying out their role. The basis upon which to judge the merit of an art is to assess the quality and quantity of feeling being transmitted. A plan, like a canvas covered in paint, is not enough. The plan must be accepted by the commander and followers alike. Therefore, I suggest that the military arts are the transmission of confidence in defeating the enemy by planning battle. This definition allows the three characteristics of the arts: creativity, feeling and transmission. Consider now, each component of military art.

There are three classes of import which the word *strategy* conveys in the wide variety of writings using the word. One class is that of a level of command, i.e. a degree of power, or size of executing unit. Soviet military theorists such as Rotmistrov, Zav'yalov and others support the notion that a level of command defines strategy. Col. Franz places strategy in a hierarchy: tactics operates up to the level of division, grand tactics involves corps to army groups, while strategy is concerned with theater and multi-theater commands. The word *strategy* is thus fixed in meaning: relevant to world war, especially that of 1939-1945. However, this class of usage is wasteful of a critical word of the military lexicon. Established scales already exist as a substitute for this use of the word strategy such as national policy, a particular command level or a level of importance.

The geographers Moellering and Tobler use strategy and tactics in typical terms of physical scale—the second class of import, citing a parallel between site

Table of "Strategy" Meanings

Sun Tzu	Eight considerations: economics, sovereign, general's character, organization, movement, control, terrain and weather.
Polyeanus	Maneuver & strategems: all possibilities, or the whole situation.
Frederick the Great	Used "plans of campaign" in the absence of the word "strategy."
USSR	Policy conducting the whole war effort, prerogative of the Party.
Drew	Synonymous with the plan; a process, an art and a science.
Tashjean	Inherent in an ethnic philosophy, e. g. European strategy versus Asian.
Common usage	Important; a concern of the national government.
Clausewitz	Employment of battle to gain the end of war; whole military action; a plan to regulate combatant.

or situation, local or global, and tactical or strategic (respectively). Defining *strategy* as a matter of global import is weak. Geography already provides a variety of alternative words. For example, small or large scale (small scale—large area), geographic, chorographic, topographic or micrographic are more definite without being in any way precise. The above two imports of the word *strategy* are better imparted using words of the relevant scale.

The third class of ideas contained by *strategy* is perhaps the word's meaning; it is unity. The totality or whole nature of strategy is a characteristic recognizable in the source of the word *strategos*, emphasized by Mao, and readily inferred from Clausewitz' assertion that strategy is about the aim of the whole military action. After Jomini, a strategic plan encompasses the entire theater of operations and, therefore, all the factors concerned with defeating an enemy. It is not partial in character but has unity. From this assertion it follows that strategy is the jurisdiction of a maneuver commander.

This deletion of scale from the definition is at variance with convention. Over the long period of time that *strategy* has been in use, fighting units have changed; the word has not. A Greek army consisted of one or a few masses of combatants. Jomini wrote in an era when a regiment or battalion was drilled to operate as a single weapon system. Thus, the maneuvering parts of an army were large but few in type. Generals commanded such aggregations; thus strategy is associated with that rank. Today, a section leader commands more firepower in quantity, in variety, in the number of individual maneuvering soldiers, and in area controlled. Such a commander fights isolated enemy forces of similar enemy configurations, giving many small unit engagements integrity. Therefore, noncommissioned officers are frequently strategists. Rank of the artist or size of the plan are no longer qualifications of a strategy. The quality of a plan being whole is the substitute requisite, if not the original meaning.

The whole characteristic is not to be confused merely with a general plan or some grand conception. It includes attention to all of the many details involved in a military maneuver. Tolstoy told a parallel story of a Russian art teacher who demonstrated the need for attention to detail in order to give the whole undertaking a sensation. "Once when correcting a pupil's study, Bryulov (a Russian artist) just touched the student's painting effort in a few places and the poor dead study immediately became animated. 'Why, you only touched it a wee bit and it is quite another thing!' said one of the pupils. 'Art begins where the wee bit begins,' replied Bryulov, indicating by these words just what is most characteristic of art."

Similarly, strategy is more than a plan; it is a plan of a whole undertaking which includes the general theme, and the interrelationships among the details. The result must transmit to each team member a feeling of confidence in defeating the enemy—large arrows upon a map are insufficient.

The word *tactics* is like *strategy*; it has a variety of meanings and connotations. A common characteristic of the two words that is universally accepted is that both tactics and strategy are military arts.

Tactics is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as the "art of disposing troops or warships especially for or in battle: a procedure adapted for carrying out a given policy," from the Greek taktika (tasso-arrange). Wilson and Wood say that tactics is the imaginative combination of battle drills in unexpected ways, while to Jomini it is the art of making masses of troops act at the decisive moment and point on the battlefield. I conclude from this that arrangement of troops, deployment and warfare doctrine make up the essence of tactics—which is much like strategy but with a different emphasis. There is a shift from planning to executing, yet both are necessary in the common use of the words. As a result, I find myself agreeing with Keegan: the difference between strategy and tactics as conventionally used, is elusive—even artificial.

Tactics is frequently referred to as some complement to strategy in the dichotomy of military arts. Strategy is an art in which the dominant characteristic is properly unity, totality or whole nature. Therefore, its kin is logically a partial plan of military action which inspires confidence in the followers that the pursuit, and necessary augmentation of it will defeat the enemy.

Other characteristics of this art can be derived from the reason for having only a limited plan. For instance, tactics is a reaction to a sudden situation, or limited level of command may restrict planning to, for example, limited spatial boundaries which the target exceeds. A shortage of information about the enemy may lead to a plan that only begins an operation. For example: "Further orders will follow after phase line 'red fox'."

This proposed definition of tactics is consistent with the literature. Tactics is still concerned with arranging, albeit incompletely, with carrying out policy and with battle drill combinations, but these are not defining characteristics. Now the word has a derivation based upon military art. The art is to conjure up a doubtlessly feasible way of defeating the enemy within the limited resources available, and despite confidence in the resulting plan, to recognize and allow for the many voids therein. A noteworthy resulting characteristic of tactics is the need to offset nulls with follower's capabilities. The human factor is an important aspect of some definitions of tactics.

In the fine arts, an illustrative analogy exists relating strategy and tactics. Michelangelo's "David" is a famous sculpture in which beauty is to be found in the whole as it is to be found in any of the painstakingly crafted parts of the whole. It is comparative to great strategy, except that the feeling transmitted is one of beauty rather than confidence.

Yet, both are not complete presentations. The effective conveyance of feeling (confidence and beauty respectively) is achieved by careful selection of what parts to present and by careful attention to each in crafting. The followers and the viewers fill the voids

themselves.

The distinction between strategy and tactics as defined herein is interesting in that an engagement or battle may be strategic without ever being tactical. In such a happening, the component events occur just as planned. On the other hand, a surprise engagement may lead to a battle without any strategy, but with several tactics. Units involved may be any level of echelon: the size of the force is irrelevant.

Strategy and tactics constitute the art of war, or so it is frequently asserted (e.g. Oxford), but I consider the art to be a trichotomy. A drill seems to be a military art; there are therein, the elements. A drill is a design of an action to generate a feeling of confidence in accomplishing a task under difficult circumstances. The task is the situation; there is a planner of the act, and the emotion transmitted is confidence (to defeat the enemy). Loading a weapon is a drill and the design of the steps taken is the military art. So is the sentry challenge, the vehicle inspection, the reactions to sudden awakening, and so on. Another drill is that carried out by the president of the United States and the Department of Defense, when an intercontinental missile is launched. The coding, the signals, and the firing are all one drill, despite the geographic scale. The art is the design of the intricate steps to start such a war.

There is some discussion in the literature of the words operations, operational art and operational strategy. Doerfel contends that there is a distinct subject labelled operational art; "Operational art is the intermediate level of war between military strategy and tactics." Luttwak similarly calls a theater level undertaking operational and refers to the enterprises of O'Connor (North Africa, World War II), Patton (North Africa and Europe) and MacArthur (Inchon, Korea). Col. Franz used the phrase "operational concept" to equate to army-command level planning. This is consistent with Zav'yalov of the Soviet Union. Yet, despite all of these learned officers, I must disagree with the use of scale to define a military art. The difference between strategy, operations and tactics is not a matter of generality. There is no place in the trichotomy of the art of war for any such distinction as "operational art."

Rejection of the use of operational art is consistent with the Oxford Dictionary definition, which allows the word *operation* to have a military connotation but no more. The etymology of such dates back to the eighteenth century, along with the mathematical connotation. **Blackie's Compact Etymological Dictionary** does permit the word to mean maneuver, but it appears unique in the six such sources consulted; it notably omits the word operations in the "*Appendix of Terms of Special Note in Modern Warfare.*" I conclude that the word *operations* is best used in a parallel context to the medical use—a synonym for an undertaking, and no more.

The diagram summarizes characteristics of the trichotomy of the art of war.

The most important comparative character of the art of war is that of integrity. Two arts require that a plan be complete: strategy and drill. These two arts differ from one another by virtue of a strategic plan being implemented only once by a set of players. A drill is implemented as often as is called for; it is a routine—a characteristic which is antipathetic to the other arts. Tactics are by nature reactive to a threat or situation. Strategy and drill anticipate a threat or situation. They are active.

The words strategy and tactics have become hackneyed. It is best to avoid the use of such terms. Levels of government, of command, physical scales and even "important" should frequently be used in place of a military art term. Yet the military arts have very important meanings in our lexicon. When strategy, tactics and drill are removed from association with equipment, scale and organization, the writer and reader are made aware of *military art*. Herein lies the essence of battle according to Clausewitz and other military philosophers, and why the words should not be misused. ★

	ENTIRETY	FREQUENCY	MOTIVE
Strategy	**whole**	**once**	**active**
Tactics	**partial**	**once**	**reactive**
Drill	**whole**	**frequently**	**active**

Intelligence Support to Psychological Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

by Lee Steward

Preparation of the low intensity battlefield is dependent on much more than terrain analysis and concentration of troops and weapons at the appropriate time and place. U.S. Army support to low intensity conflict (LIC) includes participation in internal defense and development. Psychological operations (PSYOP) prepare the low intensity battlefield for the benefit of the United States and friendly indigenous forces. The goal is to gain the assistance or cooperation of the local population or target audience, to discredit an insurgent hierarchy in order to reduce morale, and to cause dissent or defection within insurgent ranks.

The intelligence officer, regardless of echelon, is responsible for providing intelligence information throughout the life cycle of a psychological operation. This supports the PSYOP plan and affords PSYOP personnel the ability to adjust plans, target audiences and themes based on current information. PSYOP in LIC differs from other conflicts in that the target audience may vary from operations directed at the host population to operations directed at an insurgent group or enemy force. In LIC, the intelligence officer must provide historical and current information on socio-economic matters, political affairs, enemy structure and personalities. This is a much broader base of information than that of mid-intensity warfare PSYOP directed primarily at an enemy force.

Overall, PSYOP policies and programs in a host country are established and coordinated at the national level. These programs provide general guidelines within which lower military and civilian echelons plan and conduct PSYOP. U.S. Army units should ensure their PSYOP plans are in consonance with the objectives of their higher headquarters. National level objectives, host country PSYOP programs, and the programs of the political subdivisions within which they are operating must also be considered. All PSYOP programs must be approved to ensure they do not conflict with other programs or plans.

U.S. PSYOP should concur with the host country PSYOP objectives, target audiences and priorities; however, at times, these may not be entirely appropriate for U.S. forces. For example, a host country may list its armed forces as the primary target audience, while U.S. military PSYOP may consider the civilian population or the enemy force as the principal audience.

U.S commanders and staff officers should realize all military actions have psychological implications that influence the attitudes and behavior of those affected. The S2 should coordinate closely with the PSYOP staff officer and both should be included in all planning for updated intelligence on possible PSYOP targets. They must know and disseminate the psychological effects of the operation and explain how to integrate PSYOP. This will increase effectiveness of operations and minimize the hostility of the indigenous population towards host country and U.S. personnel.

To be successful, the S2 must fully understand the intelligence needs of PSYOP personnel. The S2 must also understand how PSYOP help support the tactical mission and how they add to successful operations when properly applied. In fact, intelligence is the life blood of successful PSYOP because it provides information about population attitudes, persuasions of the target audience, and current changes in the environment.

PSYOP intelligence is concerned with information of specific target groups within a country, such as hostile committed and uncommitted groups. The target in a LIC area can be the enemy or the population. The S2 must be familiar with the host country customs, culture, socio-economic data and politics.

S2 collection plans and data base holdings must include those items needed to support PSYOP. Much of this information is already available in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, with the exception of a detailed population analysis. This key factor is critical to successful PSYOP. To understand a population, the S2 must know their methods of communication. This includes the use of sophisticated electronic communications means, as well as knowing how rumors are circulated within a group.

The S2 supports PSYOP from the planning stages to the termination of an operation. One requirement is to determine the effectiveness of a particular theme or operation. The displaced person, refugee, defector or prisoner should be queried to determine if the PSYOP message is reaching the target population. Also, these individuals can greatly aid the S2 in gathering information to support current or future PSYOP.

The population may support an insurgent either out of conviction or through involuntary or unwitting involvement. The PSYOP mission, then, would be to cause a withdrawal of support from the hostile effort and defection to the host government. A surrender or return (amnesty) program is an effective approach to this end, and the S2 benefits in his ability to exploit for tactical information.

When dealing with hostile groups, the S2 needs to determine the effectiveness of PSYOP. Have we divided, discredited or destroyed an insurgent or enemy force? Psychological destruction is an important goal because without it, the insurgent force may simply disappear underground to reorganize and resurface at a more opportune time. The S2 must be able to determine when this occurs. Rudimentary intelligence analysis and collection planning support the PSYOP mission of exploiting differences be-

tween insurgent cadre, recruits, supporters and the local population.

Intelligence support to PSYOP in LIC should provide current and accurate information concerning host population target audiences, as well as insurgent target audiences. Collection must concentrate on acquiring specifics relating to a population's socio-economic conditions, political attitudes and communications methods. PSYOP is an integral part of internal defense and development programs and can be an effective combat multiplier if used properly.

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Front End Analysis

In May 1986, USAICS hosted a LIC Front End Analysis (FEA) to determine critical areas in which LIC intelligence should be taught. Representatives from USAICS and the field participated.

The FEA identified 23 critical areas with 147 tasks. The Low Intensity Task Group presently teaches many of these tasks, and others are being integrated into current training. Unfortunately, some tasks cannot be taught at present, due to a lack of available time.

The results of the FEA are being staffed within USAICS. The recommendations of the FEA will guide intelligence training in LIC for years to come.

POC for LIC Training at USAICS is Capt. Levesque or Mr. Steward, AUTOVON 879-3355/3925, or (602) 538-3355/3925, or write: ATSI-TI-ST (LITG), Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000.

USAISD Notes

Training for Electronic Warfare Operations at the National Training Center

by Sgt. 1st Class Casimer Wozniak

The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., is one of the most realistic proving grounds for U.S. Military Intelligence (CEWI) units.

For the EW units that come to Fort Irwin, life is no different than it is for the maneuver brigade they are supporting. The oppressive, dry weather and desert and mountainous terrain challenge the EW operators and analysts to excel. Under such adverse conditions they can prove to the brigade commander exactly what CEWI assets are capable of providing to support his fire and maneuver scheme.

The advantages the NTC affords the brigade are numerous. NTC's organic motorized rifle regiment includes Soviet-modeled combined arms task forces, artillery, combat support and combat service support assets. NTC also has a seemingly endless maneuver area which provides realistic training opportunities. An objective which must be seized 30 kilometers away is actual distance. The dead spaces created by the numerous terrain features can cause signals to slip in and out of reception range. Line of bearing data must be analyzed for both accuracy and intelligence value.

EW elements also benefit from the fact that they are operating against a Soviet-styled enemy. The order of battle of the OPFOR, to include radio networking, is very similar to that which can be expected of a Soviet-trained enemy. CEWI units that train extensively in garrison consistently seem to do better at the NTC. The

OPFOR soldiers at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., dismounting from an IFV employ Soviet doctrinal tactics to challenge friendly forces. (U.S. Army photo)

operators and analysts must "understand" the OPFOR and quickly identify and report what they collect for the commander to exploit. This "deep ear" on the battlefield allows the supported units to outmaneuver and ultimately defeat the enemy, whether the threat encountered is comprised of ground or aerial assets.

The OPFOR is not limited to maneuver elements. The REC (radio electronic combat) company is capable of executing most Soviet EW operations. From intercept to jamming to radio targeting, the REC company is a formidable weapon on the NTC battlefield.

The EW units at NTC must move with the combat arms elements and support their effort. When the EW assets are deaf, the commander is at a distinct disadvantage that often proves fatal.

The key is to train the EW assets. The critical points to address in the training phase are:

1. Soviet order of battle and maneuver.
2. Map reading, map reading and map reading.
3. Land navigation.
4. PMCS for prime movers and electronic equipment.
5. Collection and jamming techniques and how desert and mountainous terrain affect them.
6. TCAE operations: Even if the EW unit only fields a Traffic Analysis Team, they must be trained to perform normal TCAE functions such as data maintenance and asset tasking.
7. Teamwork: Identify the NTC players early and train them together.

The more you train for NTC, the bigger your advantage against the OPFOR. And remember, you are fighting in their "country." They know the terrain, and how to use it.

Thus, if your chain of command informs you that your team or platoon is scheduled for a rotation at NTC, don't panic. **Train for it.**

When the exercise is over, your brigade will be able to critique your performance from several points of view. From the ground, the S-2 will be able to tell you how reliable your information has been, based on an all-source verification.

The NTC also has a cadre of highly trained and experienced observer/controllers (OCs). The OCs conduct periodic after-action reviews (AARs) of the entire brigade and each task force, normally after critical battles. If your intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE) or platoon leader returns to your headquarters with a list of technical and doctrinal comments from the tactical operations center, chances are he just attended an AAR. Realize that the OCs will comment on both positive and negative aspects.

These OPFOR vehicles at the National Training Center provide realistic training opportunities for all levels of SIGINT and EW operations. (U.S. Army photo)

Additionally, most of the service schools are asked to support one or more rotations annually with a subject matter expert (SME) from their school. This SME is usually a senior NCO or company grade officer with a tactical background and experience in school doctrine, trends, new techniques and changes taking place in his particular CMF. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School and its subordinate campus, the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, combine to support approximately five rotations annually in this manner. The SMEs are not actual OCs. Their main function is to train and advise the "players" and relay information to TRADOC schools for incorporation into MOS courses and doctrinal literature. The SMEs will also provide suggestions to improve operations.

Finally, if the ground assessors cannot provide sufficient unit training evaluation data, the NTC can provide an "aerial assessment." The main battle areas of the NTC are interconnected by a system of sensor stations, to which most of the MILES gear is tuned. The entire system is tied into the STARWARS center, which monitors all battlefield action.

Engagements are recorded on video, enabling the commander to decide whether a judgment that was made based on EW indications was actually valid. He can thus determine the extent of the EW role in that battle.

In summary, the key to EW success at NTC is training. Train for the exercise. Use all available resources and seek out those in your MOS who have previously trained at NTC. Use the critiques and after action reviews as focal points for future unit training. In this manner, you will improve your unit's readiness posture, since the next enemy will not be as forgiving as the NTC OPFOR.

How to Appeal an Evaluation Report

Several thousand evaluation reports are written each year on officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers. Historically, the majority of those who render evaluation reports discharge this important responsibility with care and consideration in accurately recording the performance and potential of their subordinates.

But there are some rating officials who have not written reports as accurately and objectively as intended in the governing regulations.

If you receive an evaluation report that you believe is inaccurate, unjust or administratively incorrect, it may be a candidate for appeal.

If you are simply dissatisfied with your report, you should be aware that it is difficult to successfully challenge the judgment of your rating officials with clear and convincing evidence that you deserved better. Even if you are successful, the remedy applied would probably be to remove the portions proven inaccurate or unjust, rather than to raise the scores or block placements.

You should begin preparation of an appeal as soon as possible after receipt of an evaluation report with which you have good reason to strongly disagree. Some find reluctance on the part of the would-be supporters still serving under the same rating chain and this should be taken into consideration. Waiting too long, however, adds to the difficulty of locating supporters and gathering evidence.

If you wait until you have been nonselected for promotion to begin preparation of an appeal, the chances are that you will be rushed in gathering evidence in hopes of having the appeal considered before the next promotion board. In most cases a hastily prepared appeal is not successful.

Begin laying the ground-work with a thorough review of the appropriate Army regulation in effect at the time the challenged report was prepared. On your copy note any instances where provisions of the governing regulation were not followed. You may want to ask your local MILPO or staff judge advocate for help. While minor inconsistencies or irregularities in the preparation of an evaluation report are not usually the sole basis for removal, they add to the overall consideration of the merits of an appeal. Some serious irregularities, such as improper rating officials, may warrant full or partial relief.

Carefully examine the challenged report and make note of every entry, evaluation and narrative comment with which you disagree. Be able to answer these questions:

- Are there errors in the administration portion of the report, such as your name, grade, social security number, MOS, inclusive rated periods, duty description or rating chain?
- Are there factual records to back you up?
- Are there inaccurate or unjust entries on the substantive portions of the report?
- Are there third party observers, records and reports that would back up your contentions?

Make a list of those who were able to observe your performance during the period of the challenged report and who would provide a statement of support. Concentrate on identifying those who would have known the expectations and demands of your rating officials and your working relationship with them. For example: battalion command sergeant major in support of operations sergeant, or battalion executive officer in support of assistant S3. Make a list of any records or reports that might refute portions of the challenged evaluation. Published rating chains, for instance, are often used to contest the correctness of the evaluation officials.

To locate the people who will support your appeal, check first with your local MILPO to see if your installation has a copy of the U.S. Army Locator for members on active duty. If so, make arrangements to review that file for current Army addresses. If not available, send your list (include full name and social security number) to the Active Army Locator, U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. 46249. For those known to have retired, send your list to HQ, Department of the Army, ATTN: DACF-ISRV, 2461 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, Va. 22332-0400. For those known to be discharged, send your list to the National Personnel Records Center, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, Mo. 63132. In each request, you must state that it is for official use in support of an evaluation report appeal.

With respect to records and reports that might be of assistance to you, write to the S-1 or adjutant of your former unit and request copies of those applicable to you or your job. If an inspection report was prepared by a higher headquarters, write to that headquarters after obtaining the address at your local installation.

While awaiting response to your request for support, begin preparation of your basic letter of appeal. Identify your name, rank, branch, social security number, period of report and priority of your appeal, as determined in the appeal chapter of the appropriate regulation. Include an autovon or commercial phone number and current mailing address. Home address may be used, if preferred.

Identify the specific portions of the report that you contest and clearly state your disagreement. Be clear, brief and specific. Limit your explanation to basic facts. If detailed information is essential, add your own statement as an enclosure to the appeal.

Request the specific changes you believe are justified by the evidence you provide. Your request may be a combination of changes or total removal of the report. Remember that you must document your request with sufficient evidence to warrant corrective action.

Submit the final original appeal, plus one complete copy, directly to the address listed in the appropriate regulation (AR 623-205 for enlisted

and AR 623-105 for officers) for your rank component (i.e., officer, enlisted: active duty, Reserve or National Guard). Verify that all necessary information (i.e., signature, date, mailing address, telephone number and priority) has been included before forwarding the appeal. All supporting statements must be original and all documents provided must be original or certified true copies.

The Appeals and Corrections Branch of the respective active, Reserve or National Guard component will review the case and either notify you by letter that the appeal has been accepted or is being returned for lack of usable evidence. Administrative appeals will be resolved by the appropriate Appeals and Corrections Branch for your component. Substantive appeals will be further forwarded for final review and decision by the DCSPER Enlisted Special Review Board (ESRB) or Officer Special Review Board (OSRB), as appropriate. Upon final determination of the case, the appropriate agency will notify you of the outcome.

The time necessary to process an appeal varies with its type and complexity, the number of appeals being processed, and the extent of deliberation required to make an appropriate decision. Some appeals may take as long as six months to adjudicate. Processing priorities are explained in the Army regulation. "First Priority" processing is reserved only for appellants who face near term, mandatory release dates from active duty within six months.

If your appeal is denied, you may seek additional evidence and resubmit, or you may request relief from the next agency in the Army's redress system, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Operation of the ABCMR is governed by AR 15-185. If your case was decided by the OSRB or ESRB, a case summary of the board's consideration is available under the Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA). A request in accordance with AR 340-17 and AR 340-21 for a copy of the case summary under the FOIA/PA should be sent to: U.S. Army MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-ALS, 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, Va. 22332-400.

Chapter 4, AR 623-205 (enlisted) and Chapter 9, AR 623-105 (officer and warrant officer) contain specific regulatory guidance concerning evaluation report appeal policies and procedures. In addition, each regulation, effective May 1, 1986, now includes a separate appendix which provides prospective appellants with step-by-step information on how to put a credible appeal together.

Maintaining Foreign Language Skills in Today's Army

by Judith E. Brooks, Ph.D.

How do you ensure that linguists maintain their language skills? This is one of the most important problems confronting commanders of units that include language-trained personnel, and, one of the hardest to solve. With this in mind, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School is sponsoring a project to gather background data to ensure the quality of future resident and nonresident language training programs. Until now, a significant obstacle to the development of good training programs has been a lack of information about the extent and nature of changes in language skills once a student leaves the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). While it's anticipated that language skills (speaking, listening and reading) will change over time, there is a lack of specific information concerning conditions related to different types of change and their impact on job performance. Such data is critical to planners who are trying to provide training in the skills most vulnerable to deterioration and most important to successful job performance.

The project designed to bridge this information gap is being conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) and the DLIFLC. The first objective of the project is to determine the presence and extent of any language proficiency change occurring over the two to three-year period following graduation from the DLIFLC basic course. A second objective is to identify cognitive, attitudinal and personality measures which may predict success in language school as well as successful performance on language-related job tasks. A third objective is to assess whether general language proficiency is truly related to job performance for linguists who perform language-related tasks. By meeting these objectives, the Army will be better equipped with data on which to base future decisions about selecting and training MI linguists, as well as maintaining and refreshing language skills.

The language-skill change project involves collecting information on DLIFLC students in MOSs 97E, 97B, 98G and 98C who enter basic courses in Korean, Russian, German and Spanish between March 1986 and March 1987. These particular languages were chosen for their high density enrollment and range of learning difficulty.

During the data collection period at DLIFLC, Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT III) scores will be gathered in speaking, listening and reading. Information such as biographical data, language aptitude and ASVAB scores will also be collected. (See table on data collection plan.) While much of the data will be taken from student records, other data will be collected through a battery of tests designed to measure factors such as language background, language learning attitudes and motivation, cognitive style, personality traits and use of language learning strategies, all of which may be related to language acquisition and retention.

Data collection will continue through AIT. Language proficiency in speaking, listening and reading will be assessed from their scores on DLPT IIIs administered at the end of AIT. Since it is important to know how students have been using their language skills since leaving language training, a questionnaire will also be administered at the end of AIT. The questionnaire will attempt to measure the amount and type of language training received during AIT, as well as the extent of language use both in and out of school. Final course grades will be gathered as an overall indicator of AIT success and, where available, language task performance data will also be collected.

After completion of AIT, the participants will be tracked to their field

DATA COLLECTION PLAN FOR LANGUAGE SKILL CHANGE PROJECT



assignments and their language proficiency will be tested four times in the field at six-month intervals. On each field test, they will receive speaking, listening and reading components of the DLPT III to check for changes in their language skills. At the same time language proficiency is being measured in the field, questionnaires will be given to the linguists and their supervisors to assess the extent and nature of language use and training on and off the job, and the degree to which linguists are successfully performing job duties. All data gathered at DLIFLC, during AIT and in the field will be stored in a confidential, centralized data base designed exclusively for research purposes.

The language proficiency scores contained in the data base will permit researchers to examine proficiency levels at different points in time as well as any change in overall proficiency that occurs in the target group of linguists. DLPT III scores will be analyzed for language skill within each of the four languages to determine initial proficiency levels and whether the skill has significantly improved, deteriorated or stayed the same over time. This information will be provided to training developers to help them design more efficient language training.

Because language acquisition, maintenance and change are likely to depend on a variety of factors, some data analyses are planned in order to identify variables that are good predictors of initial proficiency and change in proficiency over time. Language acquisition and language retention will be examined in light of factors such as language aptitude, ASVAB scores, attitude and motivation levels, language training history, personality characteristics, type and amount of language training and the extent and nature of language use on the job. Such data will have value for Army decision-makers in both areas of linguist selection and language training.

For example, one set of data analyses will focus on the role that attitude and motivation play in language proficiency retention. Although considerable research has investigated the relationship between attitude/motivation and language acquisition, very little attention has been paid to attitude as it relates to the loss or improvement of language proficiency over time. Studies of language acquisition indicate that a positive attitude toward the learning situation and positive motivation are associated with better retention of language skills. The data collected will allow the Army to scientifically evaluate the usefulness of an attitude/motivation measure as a predictor of reading, speaking or listening skill retention.

Another set of analyses will examine the relationship between types of learning strategies students use to learn or maintain their language and proficiency. As part of the language skill change project, a strategy inventory for language learning (SILL) has been developed and field tested with students at DLIFLC. This instrument will help second language learners and training developers become aware of the most effective language learning strategies. It will also help researchers design ways to teach students how to develop and improve their learning strategies.

Other analyses will be performed to describe the relationship of general language proficiency to MOS performance during AIT and in the field. An improved understanding of this relationship will help in assessing the practical implications of a change in language proficiency for the soldier on the job. General language proficiency, as measured by the DLPT, is not necessarily indicative of job performance. The limitations of using a general language proficiency test to predict or evaluate job performance are evident, for example when a highly competent voice intercept operator does poorly on the DLPT, or when a high DLPT scorer cannot perform technical language functions on the job. Part of the data collected during this project will permit documentation of the degree to which job performance and general language ability are related. The finding of a weak relationship would support arguments for more job-specific language training and testing for MI linguists. On the other hand, the presence of a strong relationship would encourage use of the DLPT III as a tool for predicting or assessing job performance.

Another approach to interpreting proficiency change will be comparing DLPT scores to the language proficiency requirements for the position. The Intelligence Center and School has initiated a foreign language survey and analysis which will identify language proficiency requirements for MI linguists. Extensive and systematic interviews with MI linguists and their supervisors will serve as the basis for developing proficiency requirements as more valid than those which currently exist. These new requirements will help the ARI-DLIFLC project team to interpret the impact of observed changes in proficiency as critical or noncritical for the position.

The ARI-DLIFLC project will provide several benefits to the Army. The first major benefit will be the contribution of objective data about language proficiency change on which to base decisions regarding language training needs and approaches to maintaining language proficiency in the future. Moreover, the Army can use language proficiency test data in conjunction with the results of the Intelligence Center and School's language survey and analysis to tailor initial, or enhancement language training to the MOS.

Identification of the factors associated with success in language will be useful information for those who select persons for language training. The Army will also benefit from the questionnaire data collected from linguists who are in their assignments. Such data will provide a better understanding of how and to what extent linguists are using their language skills. Finally, the data that show the relationship between general language proficiency and job performance may substantiate a need for improved methods of training and evaluating the language capabilities of linguists.

MI linguists are understandably concerned about acquiring and maintaining their language skills. Well designed resident and nonresident programs are an important part of this process. The language skill change project aims to contribute to the process by identifying the change which occurs in language skill proficiency and those factors related to proficiency levels at different points in time. The interpretation of the language proficiency data will be facilitated by the data being collected simultaneously on job performance. This, plus the work already begun by

the Intelligence Center and School to identify proficiency requirements, will assist the Army in developing sound, efficient training programs tailored to meet the needs of soldiers performing in language positions.

How to Succeed as a 33CMF EW/I Systems Repairer

by Master Sgt. James H. Ollerton

The soldier in the 33 career management field (CMF) is responsible for the repair and maintenance of a wide variety of signals intelligence and electronic warfare systems used by the U.S. Army. The CMF is presently divided into two main areas of interest. The strategic area contains MOSs 33P, 33Q and 33M while the tactical area encompases the MOSs 33R, 33T and 33V (to be added in approximately 1988). Even though the methods of troubleshooting and maintaining electronic equipment are essentially the same in both the strategic and tactical areas, the specific equipment is different in manufacture and quantity. The CMF was split so that the soldier could maintain his expertise on the specific type of equipment throughout his career.

Since the technique of troubleshooting and the skills required for servicing electronic equipment are the same at all levels of echelon, the personal characteristics that determine the success of the soldier in the 33 CMF are equal.

The first consideration is mental attitude. The soldier needs to be interested in the work, as is the case in any profession; the apathetic person does not produce. An aptitude for technical and electronic applications is needed. The soldier must be willing to accept responsibility whether he is working without supervision, as he often is, or as part of a team.

Mental skill and ability must be considered next. The soldier must be able to observe minute and subtle differences in equipment or events, and to describe and account for them. He must have the ability to work with electronic equipment apparatus with patience and thoughtful attention to detail. He must be able to follow technical instructions that are either written, spoken or presented graphically. He must possess the ability to gather, measure and organize information, and from that information draw conclusions and make decisions.

Finally, the soldier must possess physical skill and manual dexterity. While great strength is not often necessary, it is sometimes required along with control and coordination to prevent damage to the equipment.

The 33 CMF is demanding and requires potential candidates to possess strong aptitudes in at least two of the categories listed. Without a positive mental attitude, a will to succeed and strong mental and physical attributes, the soldier will not be able to successfully complete the entry courses or be productive in his assignment as an EW/Intercept systems repairer.

Officer Notes

Promotion Board Observations

by Col. D.C. Biddinger

Having been a member of the 1985 Lt. Col. Active Duty List Promotion Board, I thought the following observations would be useful to the MI community.

The board consisted of 19 officers, all of whom were colonels or promotable lieutenant colonels. The board president was a major general. The board conducted three separate evaluations; primary zone (PZ) and above the zone (AZ) selection, below the zone (BZ) selection, and show cause. For the PZ/AZ selection, the board was divided into three panels of six or seven members. Each panel member voted on every file in the PZ and AZ. The panels voted as an autonomous body, but had the opportunity to discuss particular files with other panels as the need arose. Scoring was based on a scale of one through six, with an option of adding a plus or a minus.

The numerical descriptions of the scores are:

6. Absolutely yes, a rare performer.
5. Definitely, clearly above contemporaries.
4. Solid performer, deserves selection.
3. Qualified, if there is room.
2. Not qualified this year, needs more experience.
1. Do not promote, show cause.

The maximum score for one file by a panel member was a 6+, the minimum score was a 1-. To be recommended for promotion, an officer needed a total score of about 80 (on the average, a score slightly greater than 4 by each board member).

Each panel member's score was added together, and from that process a panel order of merit list (OML) was created. Each panel OML was then combined and created a board OML. The board OML represented a composite evaluation of all three panels and resulted in a numerical rank ordering of all files. The promotion cut line was determined by the maximum number of officers that could be promoted, and that number was provided in guidance to the board. If the PZ/AZ selection process were all the board had to accomplish, it would have been easy to determine who should be promoted. Those below the zone would not. But the BZ selection process also had to be completed, and BZ selectees merged into

the board OML.

Similar voting selections were used in the BZ selection process. BZ files were voted on separately by each panel, rank ordered, and a board OML created. Guidance to the board, as well as the board's unique philosophy, determined the quantity of BZ files eventually recommended for promotion. This was accomplished collectively with all board members participating. The number of BZ files recommended for promotion were then inserted into the board OML that was created through the PZ/AZ selection process above the cut line, but at the bottom of those officers recommended for promotion. This resulted in "bumping" a like quantity of PZ/AZ files from above the cut line to below the cut line. Those so bumped were not recommended for promotion.

Any file that received a score of 1 by a board member became a show cause candidate. Examples of show cause files were those involving incidents of moral turpitude, sexual misconduct, declining manner of performance of duty and exceeding weight standards. All such files were discussed in open forum by all board members and voted upon. If a majority of the board (10 members) voted yes, a letter was sent to the officer concerned requiring him to show cause why he should be permitted to remain on active duty. Show cause processes are performed by all promotion, service school, and command selection boards.

Board members were severely constrained in terms of time available to vote on a file. On the average, board members had three minutes per file. This required them to key on certain discriminators, particularly official photographs, ORBs, and selected OERs. Board members had only enough time to glance at the photograph, scan the ORB, and quickly review selected OERs (a sufficient number to determine a numerical score). Whoever opened or started voting a file within a panel was required to review everything in the file (letters of appreciation or admonishment, academic evaluations, OER appeals, all OERs, etc.).

Despite repeated emphasis by those in leadership positions, MI photographs were generally not very good. Examples include: uncreased trousers, unshined shoes, mustaches that clearly exceeded standards and old photographs (seven years old).

The board generally looked at the military education level (MEL), civilian education level (CEL), awards and assignments on the ORBs. The MEL status was by far the most important element on the ORB. Non-C&GSC graduates had less than a one percent probability of selection. It made absolutely no difference if C&GSC was attained by residence or nonresidence enrollment. CEL status, awards, and assignments were important, only as exceptions to the norm. That is, CEL 1 (Ph.D.) reflected a plus, CEL 8 (high school graduate) stood out as a minus since most majors have a college degree. A Legion of Merit was noted favorably, conversely, the lack of an award for service in Vietnam was viewed as a minus. Assignments where the rater was the vice chief of staff, Army or a unified commander stood out positively, but repeated assignments at the same post were looked upon negatively.

Complete C&GSC before you are considered for Lt. Col. If you do not, and are passed over, continue to pursue a C&GSC degree. The majority of AZ files picked up for promotion on this board were due to the completion of C&GSC.

Within the OER, the Senior Rater (SR) box score in relation to the SR's profile was by far the single most important item, because it provided the greatest quantifiable discriminator among files. We assessed OERs in terms of whether the rated officer fell into the upper, middle or lower third of the SR's profile. C&GSC graduates consistently in the upper middle third of their SR's profile were recommended for promotion, those in the lower third were not. But the shot group also had to be high. That is, the box score had to be in the first, second or third box. A box check in the middle third of the SR's profile, but in the fifth block from the top was not viewed favorably.

Thus, if you want an officer promoted to Lt. Col., place him in the upper middle third of your SR profile and also in one of the upper three boxes.

An inordinate number of SR narratives were inconsistent with the SR's box score. A senior rater should not say in the narrative that, "the rated officer is in the upper 10 percent of all majors I've known," then place him in the bottom third of the SR's profile. This occurred several times. When inconsistencies existed, the box score in relation to the SR profile was generally used as the determining factor. In some cases, this may have resulted in an unfair evaluation, and jeopardized the rated officer's promotion possibility.

SRs should carefully review their numerical evaluations and narratives to avoid inconsistencies that create uncertainty in the minds of board members. Say what you mean in a straightforward manner and place the rated officer within your profile accordingly.

Height and weight data on OERs caused a great deal of concern among board members. On several OERs the height/weight data was "whited out" and retyped in a font different from the rest of the OER. In many cases, an officer would increase in weight from one OER to the next, but also grow in height to the extent that the officer would never be overweight. Disparities also existed between height/weight data on ORBs that were recently verified by the rated officer, and height/weight data on recent OERs. Furthermore, some OERs showed height/weight data that exceeded the maximum allowable weight as determined by a pinch test, but contained no information regarding his status in an overweight program. These incidents definitely raised questions of integrity.

In order to protect the interests of the Army as well as the rated officer, SRs should carefully review OERs to insure height/weight data is accurate, clearly typed, and that appropriate explanatory remarks are provided where necessary.

Other data on the OERs was important, but only if it exceeded the norm. Most officers had all "1s" in part IV (performance evaluation), and "always exceeded requirements" and "promote ahead of contemporaries" in part V (performance and potential evaluation). If the rated officer was within the norm, it meant little. However, if the rated officer was below the norm, a negative discriminator was registered in the mind of the board member.

As the promotion statistics have

Army Officer Selected for Fellowship

Maj. Walter N. Walsh, Military Intelligence, has been selected to participate in the Director, National Security Agency Fellowship Program. During 1987, Walsh will be one of five director's fellows representing the three armed services, the U.S. Marine Corps, and career civilian employees of NSA.

The NSA director's fellowship program is designed to develop the highest leadership potential of military and civilian members of the cryptologic community. Fellows report to and receive tasks and project assignments from the director, NSA, currently Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, U.S. Army. Upon completion of the fellowship, Army officers are better prepared for leadership of Army cryptologic units, management positions at NSA, and other key roles in Department of Defense cryptologic efforts.

Army nominees to the NSA director's fellowship program are selected by a board of officers convened each January at the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. The director, NSA, makes the final selection of fellows. Army majors and lieutenant colonels with training and experience in signals intelligence and electronic warfare may express interest in consideration for the NSA Fellowship by writing: Commander, USAMILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPF-M, Stovall Street, Alexandria, Va. 22332.

indicated, MI fared well in relation to the rest of the Army. But we can do better if SRs and raters make a concerted effort to complete C&GSC, and if SRs provide narrative comments consistent with their box checks and profiles.

I would welcome comments or questions from any MI reader pertaining to the 1985 Lt. Col. Promotion Board. Write to: 500th MI Group, APO San Francisco 96343-0091.

Enlisted Notes

Noncommissioned Officer Education System

The Noncommissioned Officer Education System is one of the most important parts of the Enlisted Personnel Management System. Promotions depend on completing certain courses in the NCOES program.

According to Sgt. Maj. James B. Young of MILPERCEN's NCOES, two professional development study groups recently reviewed the program. The Army has adopted many of their recommendations to improve and simplify NCOES.

The NCOES program has been streamlined into four levels, with just one course at each level. They are the primary level, Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC); the basic level, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course; the advanced level, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the senior level, or the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

The Primary Technical and Basic Technical Courses were combined and renamed the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. The First Sergeant Course and other senior sergeants' courses were moved from NCOES to functional education on January 1. A functional course teaches a critical skill needed to perform a specific job, such as that of a first sergeant.

At the primary level, effective July 1, 1986, soldiers will have to have attended PLDC before they can be promoted to staff sergeant. Sergeants on the staff sergeant promotion list who have not completed the course as of June 30 will be removed from the list. The only exceptions will be soldiers who completed the Basic NCO Course (Combat Arms) before January 1, 1986.

Effective October 1, 1986, a soldier must attend primary level training to be eligible for attendance at the basic level.

The basic level of NCOES has two categories. The Army major commands manage the Basic NCO Course. MILPERCEN manages the BNCOC (Combat Support/Combat Service Support) under the automated Student/Trainee Management System-Enlisted Phase II (STRAMS-E2). Both courses provide junior enlisted leaders with the leadership and technical training they need to educate and supervise their subordinates.

The Army will discontinue the Correspondence Course Program for the Advanced NCO Course, effective October 1, 1986. Soldiers who have been selected to attend the resident course must attend it unless they have completed nonresident training before October 1.

Another change at the advanced level requires soldiers to complete

the Advanced NCO Course to be eligible for promotion to master sergeant, effective October 1, 1987.

At the senior level, selection board procedures will change beginning with the April board. That board will select 500 primary attendees, an increase of 40 for the Sergeants Major Academy. It will also select 100 alternates, a decrease of 50 and 250 soldiers for enrollment in the Corresponding Studies Program, an increase of 50.

The board will also determine which primary resident course selectees will attend sister service academies.

Changes in the NCOES program were made through a coordinated effort by the entire Army with feedback from literally all ranks.

Organizational Notes

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING COURSES

OFFICER/ENLISTED

Basic Amphibious Officer Course
Land Force Training Command, Atlantic, (LFTCLant) Norfolk, Va., U.S. Marine Corps

Air Intelligence Officer
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Intelligence Targeting Officer
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Joint Intelligence Orientation (Officer)
Defense Investigative Agency (DIA), U.S. Naval Station Anacostia Annex, Washington, D.C.

Marine Amphibious Intelligence Officer Course
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course Phase II (Tactical)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Naval Postgraduate School, National Security and Intelligence Program
Monterey, Calif., U.S. Navy

Naval Intelligence Officer
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Reconnaissance Sensor System (Officer/Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Army

Remote Sensor Specialist Course (Officer/Enlisted)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Reserve Officer Amphibious Intelligence Orientation
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Electronic Warfare Course (Officer)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Intelligence Research Officer Technician Course
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (Tactical All-Source Intelligence Officer)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Military Intelligence Officer Course Phase II (Counterintelligence/Counterintelligence Assistant)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Tactical Intelligence Staff Officers Course
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Postgraduate Intelligence Course (Officer)
DIA Anacostia Annex, Washington, D.C.

Foreign Language Training (Officer/Enlisted)
Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey, Calif.

Security Management (Officer/Enlisted)
Fort McClellan, Ala., U.S. Army

Air Intelligence Process I (Officer/Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Army

Image Interpretation (Officer/Enlisted)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Image Interpretation Specialist (Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Amphibious Combat Intelligence (Entry Level) (Enlisted)
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Amphibious Intelligence (Intermediate Level) (Officer/Enlisted)
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Amphibious Intelligence Specialist (Advanced) (Officer/Enlisted)
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Intelligence Man (Air/Ground) (Enlisted)
LFTC, San Diego, Calif., U.S. Marine Corps

Intelligence Operations Specialist (Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Marine Corps

Intelligence Specialist (Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Marine Corps

Interrogation Course (Enlisted)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Counterintelligence Agent (Enlisted)
Fort Huachuca, Ariz., U.S. Army

Physical Security (Enlisted)
Fort McClellan, Ala., U.S. Army

Amphibious Intelligence Resource Management (Officer)
LFTCLant, U.S. Marine Corps

Defense Sensor Interpretation and Applications (Officer/Enlisted)
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., U.S. Air Force

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar

Interpretation (Officer/Enlisted)
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., U.S. Air Force

National Senior Intelligence Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Air Intelligence Process II (Officer/Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Basic Photograph Interpretation (Officer/Enlisted)
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Introduction to ADP as Applied to Intelligence
Lowry Air Force Base, Colo., U.S. Air Force

Soviet Threat Awareness (Officer/Enlisted)
Bolling Air Force Base, Md., U.S. Air Force

Senior Enlisted Intelligence Curriculum (Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Collection Management (Officer/Enlisted) Washington, D.C., DIA

National System Users Executive Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Basic DIAOLS/COINS (Officer/Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Joint Intelligence Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Intelligence Indications and Warning (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Mid-Career Naval Intelligence Training Program (Officer/Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Terrain Analysis (Officer)
Fort Belvoir, Md., Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (Officer/Enlisted)
Fort Belvoir, Md., DMA

Dynamics Of International Terrorism (Officer/Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Fla., U.S. Air Force

Foreign International Affairs Course (Officer/Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Fla., U.S. Air Force

Unconventional Warfare Course (Officer/Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Fla., U.S. Air Force

Advanced Tactical Intelligence Course (Air) (Officer/Enlisted)
Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., U.S. Air Force

CIRC II Basic (Officer/Enlisted)
Dayton, Ohio, U.S. Air Force

CIRC II Advance (Officer/Enlisted)
Dayton, Ohio, U.S. Air Force

Circ II Profiles (Officer/Enlisted)
Dayton, Ohio, U.S. Air Force

National Security Affairs (Officer)
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Intelligence (Officer)
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Photo Miniaturized Intelligence Data Base (NIPS) (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., Fleet Intelligence Training Command, Pacific (FITCPac)

Shipboard Intelligence Officer (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Amphibious Intelligence Officer (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Intelligence-Imagery Interpretation-Basic (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Intelligence Photography-Basic (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Enlisted Intelligence Assistant (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Special Security Administration and Physical Security (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Pacific Fleet Operational Intelligence Afloat (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Naval Special Warfare Intelligence (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Political Warfare/Antiterrorism (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Intelligence Tactical Sensors-Basic (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., FITCPac

Soviet Military Orientation Course (SMOC) (Officer)
Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Threat Directorate

Landing Force Staff Planning (MAU Staffs)
San Diego, Calif., LFTCPac

C3 Countermeasures (Officer/SNCO)
San Diego, Calif., LFTCPac

Communications Security (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., LFTCPac

Amphibious Reconnaissance Course (Officer/Enlisted)
San Diego, Calif., LFTCPac

Scout Swimmer (Enlisted/Reserve)
San Diego, Calif., LFTCPac

NATO Electronic Warfare Courses

(1) Tri-Service Introductory EW Course for middle officer ranks (Rennes, France). Course language is French and is intended for operational officers with no previous EW training.

(2) Land Force Introductory EW Course for middle officer ranks (Feldafing, Germany). Intended for operational officers with no previous EW training.

(3) Land Force Advanced Course for middle officer ranks (Anzio, Italy). Intended for operational officers with EW experience.

(4) Air Staff Officers Course for middle officer ranks (Cranwell, United Kingdom). Intended for staff and command officers with little or no EW experience.

(5) Air Force Advanced EW Course for middle officer ranks (Lagerlechfeld, Germany). Intended for operational and staff officers with EW experience.

(6) Joint Senior Officers EW Course (Cranwell, United Kingdom). Intended for colonels, generals and Navy equivalents.

(7) Maritime Advanced EW Course for middle officer ranks (Southwick Fareham, United Kingdom). Intended for officers with EW knowledge and experience.

(8) Joint Service Advanced EW Staff Officers Course (NATO School SHAPE, Oberammergau, Germany). EW experience is required.

(9) Joint EW Course. (NATO School SHAPE, Oberammergau, Germany). Intended for officers with little EW experience.

(10) Joint Service Course for EW planning and analysis in exercises (NATO School SHAPE, Oberammergau, Germany).

(11) EW in Joint Ace Operations (NATO School SHAPE, Oberammergau, Germany). Intended to provide general/flag officers with an understanding of various aspects of EW.

FEEDBACK

(Continued from page 5)

***Intersearch**, International Terrorist Research Center, P.O. Box 26804, El Paso, Texas 79926.*

***International Terrorism Newsletter**, edited by Charles M. Hellebusch. Box 22425, Louisville, Ky. 40222.*

***Inform—National Reports**, Inform, Box 489, Elizabeth, N.J. 07207. These reports aim to uncover and combat subversive organizations in the United States.*

***The Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs**, The Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla. 33124. Printed by Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif.*

***Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill. 60115.*

***Le Mercenaire**, Intelligence newsletter for professionals on terrorism, Communist subversion and covert operations. Box 507, Frederickstown, Mo. 63645.*

***Monthly Intelligence Report and Special Reports for Professionals**, Allan Paul, 70 Shadow Lane, Orchard Park, N.Y. 14127.*

***New Internationalist**, 113 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201. Contains reports on political and social activities in Third World countries.*

***Political Communication and Persuasion**, An international journal edited by Yonah Alexander. CSIS, Georgetown Univ., Washington, D.C., published by Crane, Russak and Co., 3 E. 44th St., New York, N.Y. 10017. This quarterly journal includes articles on propaganda, psychological warfare, peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building assignments of political communicators.*

***Red Line**, Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, Box 11312, Clayton Branch, St. Louis, Mo. 63015. A monthly journal which provides educational information about current Communist propaganda.*

***Special Weapons**, Harris Publications, 1115 B'way, New York, N.Y. 10010. Police and military counter-terrorist weapons and tactics. Illustrated.*

***Tactics**, Edited and published by Ed Hunter, 4114 E. 4th St., Box 3541, Arlington, Va. 22203. A monthly journal concerned with the tactics of psychological warfare.*

***Terrorism: An International Journal**, edited by Mark Monday. Box 3030, San Diego, Calif. 92103. This monthly journal examines national and international terrorism and recent terrorist activities. It also includes a calendar of upcoming conferences and workshops on the study and prevention of terrorism.*

***The Wilcox Report**, Editorial Research Service, Box 1832, Kansas City, Mo. 64141. A review of non-centrist U.S. political movements, propaganda, terrorism, intelligence and security.*

***Conflict Quarterly**, The International Journal of Low-Intensity Conflict. Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, E3B 5A3, Canada. Contains articles on revolution, terrorism, political warfare, propaganda and the government, media and public responses.*

***Intelligence Digest**, Intelligence International Ltd., 17 Rodney Rd. Glos. GL50 1HX, United Kingdom.*

Dear Editor:

*CWO 3 Gary L. Smith's article entitled, "Yesterday's Solution to Today's Language Crisis" (**Military Intelligence,** April-June 1986) discussed a problem interrogators constantly encounter: acquiring and maintaining language proficiency. I believe there are better solutions to the problem than those proposed by Mr. Smith. We can more efficiently meet the Army's needs by training interrogators to be good linguists.*

Mr. Smith expressed the Army's need to create a new MOS for interpreters. His plan has some obvious flaws. Today's Army is seeking ways to reduce personnel strength and cut costs. If interrogators were to consistently rely on interpreters, the Army would need to substantially increase its personnel strength and budget allocations, which is contradictory to the Army of Excellence concept.

Mr. Smith noted that interrogators face many distractions to language training, and that interpreters would have distractors at their level. Interrogators must train to fight and survive in combat. To support interrogators, interpreters must do the same. Common soldier skill training cannot be neglected in lieu of increased language training. As in any specialty, there must be a balance.

Interrogators need extensive skill training to become proficient. Hardest to master are the different approaches used to persuade the prisoners to talk. It is extremely difficult for interrogators to convey, through an interpreter, emotions that will convince the prisoners of their sincerity. Interpreters must be able to quickly grasp and transmit ideas that the interrogators are trying to convey to the prisoners. This promotes confusion and wastes valuable time. Information

Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the ***Military Intelligence*** annual Writer's Award Program, published in the January-March 1986 issue, the magazine's editorial staff is pleased to announce that Capt. William Burgess' article, "Special Operations Forces and the Challenge of Transnational Terrorism" will be the nominee for the second quarter. Nominees will be announced each quarter; the fourth quarter's nominee and the at-large nominee, will be announced with the winner in the January-March 1987 issue.

gleaned is usually highly perishable and the use of interpreters delays the information gathering task.

Creating interpreters is but one option in solving the unqualified-linguist problem. Another viable option involves initial training. The Defense Language Institute could lengthen and improve its curriculum. If it were to offer shorter courses, as Mr. Smith suggested in his article, the level of intensity would need to proportionately increase. The problem, then, would be a decrease in retention capability, quantity and quality.

Another possible solution to the unqualified-linguist problem is to recruit native linguists from other fields. A procedure to measure technical aptitude and potential skill development in conjunction with a background investigation for clearance purposes would be required. For example, a native Russian's value as a Russian linguist is too great to ignore. An aggressive recruiting and reenlistment program will also be cost-effective when language training and maintenance are considered.

The Army should also consider recruiting interrogators from other fields, primarily the combat arms. An interrogator with prior combat unit experience will be better equipped to evaluate his product. Common soldier skills will be more engrained, allowing the interrogator to further develop his more technical skills.

Additionally, retention of the interrogator MOS, regardless of rank, is essential. The interrogator is a highly trained technician with perishable skills. Those promoted to master sergeant should be given the option of retaining their specialty.

It is possible to develop successful, local language-maintenance programs. FORSCOM Circular 350-84-11, The FORSCOM Command Language Program, is a useful guide for setting up language training. An effective program must receive full command support.

As interrogators, you must inform the commander of your training strategies. Use the programs that are currently available, such as Mobile Training Teams and Redtrain opportunities. Look for new training opportunities that can be funded through Redtrain. Develop your own training, and tailor it to fit the unit's needs. Don't rely on others to incorporate worthwhile interrogation training into their field exercises. Plan your own field exercises by writing war scenarios and prisoner of war roles. Request interrogators from other units to play the roles, and cross-train. Encourage your soldiers to use their languages daily while working and training. Make it known that you have trained linguists available to help translate documents such as marriage licenses, birth certificates and sales contracts. Make arrangements with other government agencies to help them with their translation requirements. Write evaluation guides for linguists during unit ARTEPs. Soon, interrogators will be able to take advantage of the new Training Support Package that is being developed at Fort Huachuca.

The Army could assist by increasing the number of experienced linguists at Fort Huachuca. This would assist in the training of new interrogators. They currently do little of this very worthwhile training.

Interrogators who are assigned to units such as the 18th MI Battalion in Munich use their languages daily. They derive satisfaction from their work that can't be equalled by monetary incentives. Consequently, these linguists improve their skills in a cost-effective manner.

During peacetime we are all full-time trainees. Good training is sometimes costly and always demanding. With better personnel and financial management, we can have well-trained, language-qualified interrogators.

CWO 2 Randy L. Sanders

CRYPTO CORNER Solution

Sentence 1:

As soon as the fire began to slacken and the attack had been repulsed, a general arrived at a gallop with instant orders to mount and advance.

Sentence 2:

In two minutes, the four squadrons were remounted and trotting out of the Zeriba in a southerly direction.

Sentence 3:

We ascended again the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and from its ridges soon saw before us the whole plain of Omdurman with the vast mud city, its minarets and domes, spread before us six or seven miles away.

From *A Roving Commission* by Winston Churchill, Scribners, 1930.

AIRLAND BATTLE

(Continued from page 15)

battlefield, directly relate to the activities of a lethal and capable opponent who is intent on our destruction. ★

Footnotes

1. Martin Van Creveld, **Command,** (Washington, D.C.: Office of Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment, n.d.), p. 56.
2. Carl Von Clausewitz, **On War,** tran. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 117.
3. F.W. Mellenthin, **Panzer Battles,** (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 94.
4. William DePuy, ***Synchronization—A Conceptual Bridge Between C³I and Combined Arms Combat Force,*** (Unpublished paper, 27 May 1982), p. 13.
5. Field Manual 34-1, ***Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,*** (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1984), p. 1-2.
6. John W. Woodmansee, "Blitzkrieg and the AirLand Battle," ***Military Review,*** LXIV (August 1984), p. 27.
7. William R. Richardson, "Winning on the Extended Battlefield," ***Army,*** 31 (June 1981), p. 41.
8. D.L. Holder, "Maneuver in the Deep Battle," ***Military Review,*** LXIII (May 1982), p. 55.
9. Huba Wass de Czege and D.L. Holder, "The New FM 100-5," ***Military Review,*** LXIII (July 1982), p. 58.
10. Field Manual 100-5, ***Operations,*** (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 2-6.
11. Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," ***International Security,*** 5 (Winter 1980/81), p. 65.
12. FM 100-5, p. 2-9.
13. Ibid, p. 3-1.
14. Clausewitz, p. 198.
15. Ibid, p. 198.

Maj. Wayne M. Hall is currently the executive officer, 104th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Carson, Colo. He has served as an intelligence analyst with the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency and as plans officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army. Hall received a bachelor of science degree from the Univ. of Nebraska, holds a master's degree and a Ph. D. He is a graduate of C & GSC and the Advanced Military Studies Program.

Key

Plaintext sequence keyword: WINSTON

Ciphertext sequence keyword: CHURCHILL

Repeating key in third sentence: OMDURMAN

COMBINED EW

(Continued from page 9)

bined EW operations.

DON'T demonstrate an inflexibility of EW definitions or technology.

- You'll preclude many of the above benefits by supporting what, on occasion, is simply semantics.
- You'll demonstrate, perhaps, a lack of acumen within a fragile environment.

Caution: there do exist, however, serious, nationalistic differences in technical definitions. Leave those to the appropriate authorities.

Tactical commanders and all appropriate operational personnel must familiarize themselves thoroughly with those formal agreements which pertain to combined EW operations (e.g. NATO STANAGS and MC 212/1). Furthermore, memorandums of agreement and understanding exist which address the subject from the mutual support perspective. These references must be obtained and reviewed.

We all acknowledge "that which is not effectively practiced in peace will not function in war." But a new corollary may now exist—"only through the knowledge of the adjacent, allied EW units and their abilities can U.S. forces ensure the successful conduct of tactical EW in Europe." It would be wise, therefore, for unaffiliated commanders to muster their courage and curiosity and initiate realistic partnership relations with like allied EW units. Through this long term relationship, essential appreciation of training, operational procedures, and cultural variance will be gained.

Above all else in the development or maintenance of combined EW operations and relationships, a philosophy and environment of realistic equity and fairness must be firmly established with allied counterparts; for not all past initiatives have been sincere nor successful, and ultimately, personal trust is the key component in these matters.

A variety of general recommendations in the conduct of combined EW operations has been presented to you. These recommendations may prove to be valid, but only for a snapshot in time. The future techniques in the conduct of this evolutionary and sensitive subject are yet to be discussed and fully articulated; but, if our corps expands its efforts for solutions to doctrinal, equipmental, and technical differences with our EW partners, then that traditional hurdle of "language variation" will no longer be of greatest consequence. ★

The author would like to express his sincere appreciation for his operational experiences and training opportunities with both the Federal Republic of Germany "ELOKA" forces and the Royal Corps of Signals. Only through their professional guidance, candidness, and friendship could this brief commentary on a complex issue be written.

Capt. M.S. Haenchen is currently a project officer at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He has served as a platoon leader, battalion S-2, Corps SSO, operations officer, company commander, National Agency representative, and as an exchange officer dealing with both FRG and U.K. EW organizations. He has attended the basic and advanced MI courses, both the Strategic SIGINT and Tactical EW courses, the Advanced Cryptologic Course, and numerous NATO/Combined EW courses.

HIGH COMMAND

(Continued from page 22)

that the glavkoms as a group will be identified until the next obituary for a minister of defense who dies in office. Such appears to be Soviet protocol.

4. One would expect that the author of this theory would have difficulty finding enough senior Soviet four and five star generals to man all the new positions, and this is in fact the case. Of the seven postulated "Soviet TV/TVD" commands, two CINCs are listed as "unknown." Another, General of the Army V.L. Govorov is listed as "CINC, Far Eastern Theater of War," though Govorov has been publicly identified as chief of the Mail Inspectorate since September 1984, and could not possibly be a theater glavkom simultaneously. Apart from the exigent requirements of finding personnel to man extra, nonexistent commands, the article erroneously identifies other key players in the Soviet command hierarchy. Gen. I.M. Tret'yak is listed as being dual-hatted, CINC of a high command and Commander of the Far East Military District. But Gen. D.T. Yazov has held the latter post since the summer of 1984. The CINC of Soviet Air Forces is said to be P.S. Kutakhov ("Soviet Organization for Theater War," pp. 29,30). However, Kutakhov died in December 1984, at which time he was replaced by Marshal of Aviation, A.N. Yefimov.

As the article contains citations from the summer of 1985, the information cutoff date would seem to have occurred substantially after these personnel changes were publicized.

5. John Erickson, "The Soviet Military and the Future, or the Future of the Soviet Military," **Proceedings of a Conference on the Soviet Military and the Future** (Center for Strategic Technology: College Station, Texas, 1985, p. 1-2).

6. N.V. Ogarkov, **Istoriya Uchit Vditel'nosti** (Moscow: Military Press, 1985, p. 47).

7. Hines and Petersen, p. 289.

Capt. Charles Duch is a military-political analyst for Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He holds a Master's Degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School.

An Interview with Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu

Terrorism: How The West Can Win

by Capt. William H. Burgess III

Thomas Victor

The content of this interview is the product of a reviewer and an author who share a common interest. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu since 1984 has been the permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations. He is a renowned expert on international terrorism and an outstanding advocate of comprehensive and unified counteroffensive by the Western democracies against international terrorism.

Mr. Netanyahu was born in Israel in 1949. He served for five years in the Israeli Army, rising to the rank of captain. After leaving the Army, he graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), earned a master's degree from MIT's Sloan School of Management, served as a management consultant for the Boston Consulting Group, and later joined senior management at RIM Industries in Jerusalem. In July 1982, he was named Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., where he served until his appointment to the United Nations.

Since 1976, Mr. Netanyahu has been a member of the Board of Directors of Jonathan Institute, a Jerusalem-based research foundation on terrorism. The Jonathan Institute was named in honor of Mr. Netanyahu's brother, Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, the ground force commander and sole Israeli military fatality during the historic Entebbe Raid. Mr. Netanyahu was executive director of the Institute between 1978 and 1980, and organized the Institute's first and second conferences on international terrorism (in Jerusalem in 1976 and in Washington, D.C. in 1984), at which distinguished scholars, journalists and statesmen from the Western world discussed ways of combating international terrorism. Mr. Netanyahu has made numerous television talk show appearances and has had a score of articles on terrorism and the Middle East published in the **New York Times**, **The Wall Street Journal**, and **The Washington Post** to name a few. A product of the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism is ***Terrorism: How the West Can Win***, edited by Ambassador Netanyahu.

The following is a recent interview by William Burgess with the ambassador prepared as a supplement to the accompanying book review:

WB: *In what direction is U.S. strategy toward terrorism headed?*

BN: The recent actions taken by the United States are an important turning point in the battle against terrorism. They send a clear message to the capitals of the terrorist international that America will not tolerate their behavior; that it will not be intimidated; and that it is willing to take action against them, politically as in Tokyo, economically as in the recent sanctions against Libya, and militarily. America is now trying, as yet with only partial success, to align its Western allies behind a similar policy. The crucial factor is the staying power of America's political leadership and its public opinion. If the United States and the West persevere for a length of time in this course, international terrorism can and will be significantly curbed.

WB: *How can the United States prevent terrorist activities on its soil?*

"If the United States and the West persevere for a length of time in this course, international terrorism can and will be significantly curbed."

BN: First, adequate security measures should be applied in airports, airplanes and other potential terrorist targets. But obviously, we cannot put guards on every school and in every supermarket. Nor need we do so. Middle Eastern terrorists have made a conscious decision not to attack the American mainland because they feared powerful retribution. Now they have learned that even outside the United States itself, killing Americans will exact a price. If they fear a forceful action against them, they will think twice and three times before they act.

WB: *What is the message of your book, **Terrorism: How the West Can Win** and to whom is the message directed?*

BN: The message we try to bring home to Western public opinion is that terrorism is first and foremost a political and moral problem. The terrorists try to inflict fear and spread confusion. Against fear, we must have courage; yet courageous statesmen and soldiers do not emerge from

cowardly societies. So we must encourage the ordinary citizens not to be intimidated by terrorism, for example, by not canceling trips and vacation plans. Besides, the risk for the tourists is marginal, it is roughly equal to the chance of being struck by lightning. Against confusion, we must have clarity; we must recognize that terrorism is an evil; that no cause can justify the murder of innocents, and that only by standing up to the terrorists can we reaffirm our morality and our worth as human beings.

WB: *What influence will your book have overall on U.S. counterterrorist policy and strategy? What influence would you like it to have?*

BN: The Western democracies must realize we are at war against a common enemy. This war can be won if the West will unite to create an anti-terrorist alliance. We should refuse to be blackmailed, and we must be willing to fight back.

WB: *What did you do in the Israeli Army? Were you directly involved in any antiterrorist operations? If so, what was your most memorable experience?*

BN: I served for five years in the special forces of the Israeli Army in an anti-terrorist unit. Following the Yom Kippur War, I was promoted to the rank of captain. In one of our rescue operations I was wounded. That was pretty memorable.

WB: *What do you say to those who argue that the Jonathan Institute is a front for the Israeli government and that its products, such as your book, are nothing more than Zionist propaganda?*

BN: That's nonsense. The Jonathan Institute is a private research foundation. It declines any governmental support, Israel's or anyone else's, so as to be completely independent in its activities. Some of the best thinkers in the democracies - statesmen, scholars, and journalists from the United States,Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy - have attended the Institute's conferences. Overwhelmingly, they have endorsed the Institute and its objectives, precisely because they believe in its message that terrorism is not merely an Israeli problem but a problem for the West as a whole.

WB: *From an Israeli standpoint, has military retaliation against terrorists been successful?*

BN: Israel wages a continuous war against terrorism. Such a war is not limited to retaliation, however important, but also includes prevention and preemption. Based on intelligence, Israel chooses the time and place of its strikes against terrorist bases, thus obstructing their organization, training and plans. Without taking the offensive against terrorism, Israel would have been on its knees. With it,

"Terrorism is not merely an Israeli problem but a problem for the West as a whole."

and with a policy of no concessions, we've rolled back the terrorist tide. For example, during the 1970s Israel was subjected to a spate of hostage-takings. But in each case, the government refused to deal with the terrorists, and Israeli forces intervened, freeing the hostages and killing the terrorists. During this period, Israel continuously struck back at terrorist bases, and punished the countries that sheltered them. As a result, hostage-taking, technically a simple operation for terrorists to carry out—all you need is one thug with a Kalashnikov—became a rarity inside Israel. Israel's successful experience is the best proof of the value of seizing the offensive against terror.

WB: *What effect can air strikes against Libya have on international terrorism?*

BN: The U.S. raid on Libya had a great effect. Some in the West anticipated an escalation, a "cycle of violence," if the United States struck back. In reality nothing of the kind has happened. On the contrary, the leaders of terrorist states try to disassociate themselves from terrorism. We have clear indications that they have called off many planned attacks. They are now waiting to see if this was a one-shot operation by the United States and its allies, or the harbinger of a new policy of firmness. If we keep up the pressure and convince them that there will be a price, we can deter them from further attacks.

WB: *How can the West deal with the world's greatest sponsors of terrorism, without risking escalation to thermonuclear confrontation?*

BN: Behind virtually all international terrorism are regimes which use such tactics to wage war by proxy against their enemies. These regimes turn to this shadow war precisely because they fear the risks that open war entails. So the first order of the day is to strip them of the cloak of deniability. The public exposure of the involvement of a major power in international terrorism since the early 1980s has caused them to curb their support for some of these groups. After your raid on Libya this superpower has sought to distance itself from that regime. And, the fact that they did not come to help the PLO in Lebanon is also a good indication of the course they will take in the face of Western determination.

WB: *Is assassination a justifiable, legitimate option for use by the West against international terrorists? Under what conditions, if any, would you feel assassination to be appropriate?*

BN: A terrorist leader who orders or perpetuates the murder of innocents should ideally be apprehended and brought to trial. But often that is not possible, so we should not rule out the targeting of such individuals. Otherwise they will not merely escape justice but will end up murdering more people. I should add, though, that the problem of stopping terrorism is not limited to stopping individual leaders. We have to target the regimes and organizations which direct, sponsor, finance, train and launch international terrorism. If we truly want to fight terrorism we need to apply concerted political, economic and, if appropriate, military sanctions against these regimes.

WB: *Your book has greatly heightened your visibility. Do you feel this has increased the chances that you will be a target of international terrorism?*

BN: The terrorists try to paralyze us by attempting assassinations of leading figures in our societies. In fact, very often they direct their attack against those people within their own society who dare speak against them. For example, over the years the PLO has killed more moderate Arabs than

Israelis. I do not know if I personally am a target, because we are all targets; but I am certainly not going to be deterred by such threats.

WB: *Do you plan a follow-on to your book, such as one focusing on the military strategies the West can employ against international terrorism?*

BN: The Jonathan Institute will certainly hold more conferences and issue more publications. We feel that there is still a great need to educate public opinion on this subject, and there is still much to be discussed and achieved. We have not yet considered any specifics, and are open to suggestions. I'm not sure though, that a public discussion of the military tactics against terrorists is a gocd idea. You know, they read our stuff too. ★

Terrorism: How the West Can Win, edited by Benjamin Netanyahu, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York: 1986, 245 pages, $18.95

Much has been said and written over the past several years to illuminate the subject of international terrorism. Few books, however, have been as timely, lucid and pragmatic as **Terrorism: How the West Can Win**, a collection of short and thoroughly readable essays by three dozen distinguished international experts in the field. The contributors were participants in a June 1984 conference on international terrorism sponsored in Washington, D.C. by the Jonathan Institute (a Jerusalem research foundation named in honor of Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, ground commander and sole Israeli military fatality during the 1976 Entebbe Raid). The book is superbly edited and contributed to by Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu, brother of the late Jonathan and an expert on terrorism in his own right.

> "We have to target the regimes and organizations which direct, sponsor, finance, train and launch international terrorism."

The book starts with a clear and concise definition of terrorism as the "deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends." Throughout, successive authors emphasize that the terrorists *deliberately* target those who do not see themselves as military targets nor who are viewed as such under the laws and customs of war, that this is opposite the policies and practices of bona fide guerrillas who consciously avoid hurting noncombatants, and that this distinction and other factors place the terrorist apart from a true "freedom fighter." As the late Senator Henry Jackson said, quoted in a piece by Secretary of State George P. Schulz: "The idea that one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing noncombatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists."

The terrorists and their sponsors, to the authors, are a variant of organized crime who should be dealt with accordingly. Furthermore, the West should reject what author Midge Dector calls the "theory of grievances" by which some see the grievances of terrorists as somehow justifying terrorist acts. In addition, the West must abandon what author Jack Kemp calls the "false symmetry" by which Western support to true freedom fighters is equated with totalitarian support for those who would impose tyranny. Collectively, the authors propose that the nations of the West (and, by implication, all other states threatened by international terrorism) unite in a strategy composed of the following elements:

A no concessions policy toward terrorists, backed up with the means and willingness to apply force.

A systematic, comprehensive and sustained campaign of political, economic and military action against the terrorists and their sponsors, ranging from denial of aircraft and ship landing rights in the West to direct military action against foreign terrorist bases.

Coordination of special anti-terrorist forces in a common doctrine and through bilateral and multilateral treaties outside the framework of the United Nations.

Shutting down terrorist forward support operations in the West through closing consulates and embassies, expelling diplomats and severing diplomatic and commercial relations in situations where direct links to terrorist activities are discovered.

Putting "neutral" nations on notice that they will become targets of the West, if they provide safe passage to terrorists, accept a hijacked plane without assisting in the rescue of the hostages or preventing the hijackers' escape, or refuse to extradite or punish terrorists.

Educating the press to stop legitimizing the terrorists with "air time" and sympathy and start exposing and repudiating terrorist crimes to galvanize public opinion against the terrorists.

Essentially, Netanyahu and the other authors call for a Western democratic "jihad," or total war, against the actors and sponsors of terrorism, underlaid with a "moral understanding that terrorism, under whatever guise or pretext, is an inexcusable evil, that it obliterates the political and moral distinctions which are the foundation of humane and free life under the rule of law; that the West, in short, must resist terrorism and ultimately defeat it." The terrorists, to the authors, are not just the minor nuisances claimed by some (Admiral (ret.) Stansfield Turner and others will note, for example, that less than two dozen Americans were actually killed by terrorists last year, glossing over the "terrorism tax" manifested in increased outlays for physical security, travel restrictions and other terrorism-induced behavior modifications borne by the public), but are the forerunners of tyranny and are *hostis humani generis*, enemy of mankind. The seriousness with which the authors feel the West should view terrorist threat is summed up by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's admonition that: "Terrorist war is part of a total war, which sees the whole of society as the enemy and all of the members of society as appropriate objects for violence. It is absolute war because the goal is absolute destruction of society. Terrorists are the shock troops in a war to the death against the values and institutions of a society and the people who embody it."

Putting international terrorism directed by totalitarian states and subnational groups against the pluralist Western democracies in the proper moral and political perspective is a condition precedent to the ultimate defeat of the terrorist threat by the West. The West must realize that the terrorists and their sponsors are a malignancy in the human condition that can never be salved and must be excised. Yet, the West has not attained this perspective because of collective greed, cowardice, moral confusion and poor leadership. In the interim, the terrorist international has experienced unprecedented physical, moral and military growth culminating in the emergence of the first terrorist states with a corresponding rise in the probabilities, as decried by author Senator Allan Cranston, that the terrorist arsenal against democracy may someday include weapons of mass destruction: The onslaught against the West presages a New Dark Age of jungle law and the absence of individual freedom.

To overcome its largely self-imposed blindness to the nature, scope and weaknesses of the terrorist threat, the democratic citizenry must engage in intelligent and comprehensive debate culminating in decisive, unified action. Sunlight, which Justice Brandeis characterized as the best of all disinfectants, must be cast full upon the terrorists and their sponsors so that the public can see with pristine clarity who they are, what they stand for, how they are attempting to achieve their goals, and why and how they should be defeated.

Terrorism: How the West Can Win is an excellent addition to the professional reading of military intelligence and special operations soldiers who face the challenge of terrorism, from tactical units in the field to the policymakers in the Pentagon. It is a statement of purpose for the war against terrorism and should be required reading at major military service schools.

Capt. William H. Burgess III
Fort Richardson, Alaska

Verification and Arms Control, edited by William C. Potter, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985, 266 pages, $29.00.

One of the most controversial issues currently facing U.S. arms control negotiators in Geneva and Vienna, is that of ensuring adequate verification for any agreement. The verification problem has been a subject for debate during every round of U.S.—Soviet negotiations extending back to the end of World War II. The significance of the verification issue has been identified, either in treaties, or in on-going negotiations as the most important standard against which arms control agreements have been measured. This work, which is a product of a conference, "Verification and Arms Control," held at the Univ. of California-Los Angeles (UCLA), in January 1984, focuses on the most disputed problem presently being examined in arms control circles: Should some verification risks be taken for the sake of achieving arms control agreements? In addressing this issue, the editor, William C. Potter, executive director of the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA, and a distinguished group of academic and scientific specialists have compiled what should become a standard unclassified reference work on the verification problem.

The verification question, as it is defined, is a need to ensure that arms control agreements are being complied with, as distinguished by the type of agreement, and by the verification means available. The verification required of a test ban treaty differs from those agreements associated with the limitation or banning of various weapons systems. In order to verify compliance of a test ban treaty, it is necessary to monitor and attempt to detect any noncomplying nuclear tests.

But the verification of weapons systems agreements is a significantly more difficult problem, necessitating the monitoring of illegal deployment and production of the specified systems.

In his article on test ban treaty verification, Warren Heckrotte, a physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, indicates that most technical verification problems concerning test ban monitoring have been solved. Additionally, of special interest, Dr. Heckrotte considers on-site inspections to be relatively valueless exercises in comparison to technical seismic monitoring. He consequently perceives the negotiation problems related to them as an unnecessary hindrance to agreements. Perceiving that it would be unrealistic to conduct an on-site inspection of even a small fraction of ambiguous, low-magnitude seismic aberrations in the Soviet Union, Dr. Heckrotte seems to consider that the theoretical low level of noncompliance risk must be subordinated to the political gain which a treaty would achieve.

The concept of political gain predominating over verification capability is also present in the articles relating to the verification of various weapons systems. It is apparent from these articles that, given the current state of technology and the resistance of the Soviets to on-site inspections, the ability to verify complete adherence to an arms control agreement is imperfect. Whether it be the verification of limitations on antisatellite weapons, manned bombers and cruise missiles, or the verification of compliance in the areas of biological and chemical warfare, these problems cannot be totally resolved because of an inability to adequately monitor production sites. This perception is best exemplified in the article, "Verification of Antisatellite Weapons" by William Durch, a doctoral student at MIT, who explains that the risk trade-off in an agreement, where every aspect of Soviet behavior could not be monitored, would be manageable in context.

The problem inherent in the inability of technical collection systems to ensure adequate verification is fully developed in an article by Jeffrey Richelson, associate professor of government at American Univ.. These problems range from an inability to image targets through the tops of structures, to the encryption of electronic data, transmitted from Soviet missiles undergoing test activity. At the same time, with the National Technical Means (NTM) of verification now available, which includes an array of reconnaissance satellites, strategic intelligence aircraft, signals intelligence, space surveillance, nuclear monitoring and ocean intelligence collection systems, the author believes that arms control agreements can be verified to the extent that any concealed treaty violation will be too insignificant to pose a potential threat to U.S. national security.

From the Soviet perspective, as indicated by Allan S. Krass, professor of physics at Hampshire College, the approach to the problem of verification differs from that of the United States. According to Viktor Israelyan, Soviet Ambassador to the 1981 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the "basic principles" of verification are based upon the premise that the sovereign rights of states must be respected and that no interference will be permitted in internal affairs. In addition, the concept of verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust. Finally, and most significantly, international forms of verification should be limited. This Soviet approach has challenged the use of on-site inspections and has carried out the encryption of missile test telemetry. These "counter-verification" reactions have clouded the formal arms control process.

In conjunction with the latest arms control proposals in Geneva and Vienna, the timeliness of this work is excellent. In February 1986, contrary to previous Soviet assertions, General Secretary Gorbachev declared that the Soviet Union was ready to accept on-site inspections as a verification device for a nuclear test ban treaty. In March 1986, U.S. negotiators at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, presented a new verification proposal which would include 30 on-site inspections a year in order to monitor a NATO/Warsaw Fact force reduction in Central Europe. It is apparent that the verification problem remains an active issue in the on-going negotiations. The technical data contained in **Verification and Arms Control** is superb and has created an exceptional unclassified data base for further analysis of verification problems. Thus, as a reference tool, this book is a necessity. However, if the reader were to use it as an analytical tool he must be aware that many of these articles portray a subordinate role of technical verification to perceived political necessity. In summary, it is the reader himself who must decide whether or not an arms control agreement, which cannot be completely verified by NTM, will be a threat to American national security.

Maj. Alan G. Stolberg
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Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism—The Witness Speaks, edited by Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Richard H. Schultz, Ernst Halperin, and Igor Lukes, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1986, 638 pages, $22.95.

Amid all the recently appearing material dealing with the subject of terrorism, **Hydra of Carnage** sets itself apart from most of the others in two ways: first, by its thoroughness in dealing with the ethical and moral dilemmas involved, and second, by the evidence it offers to support the authors' opinions. Following an excellent introduction which updates the uninformed reader on the current atmosphere of terrorism (as recently as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847), the book strives to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding and appreciation of the difficulty of dealing with terrorism. The authors start with a look at the political doctrines of several governments and organizations involved with terrorism, as well as the nature of terrorism and low-intensity conflict. Such an in-depth look at background material may seem to stray from the book's theme; however, it serves to provide the basis for a greatly enhanced understanding of the moral and ethical issues.

The authors present detailed incidents which demonstrate how the "impact of technology" has affected the evolution of terrorist organizations and those governments which deal with terrorism. They detail both the increased sophistication of the weapons and tactics used directly against targets and the increased technical nature of the terrorists' own intelligence-gathering capabilities, a facet frequently overlooked. While other material on terrorism appears to emphasize the necessity for the increased use of technical means in gathering information on the terrorist organizations, the uses which terrorists are making of the same technology for their purposes is not examined by most authors.

After explaining international and interorganizational links between various terrorist sponsoring governments throughout the world, the authors do an excellent job of sustaining the involvement of organized crime and international drug traffickers in terrorism. While the possibility of cooperation between organized crime, drug traffickers and international terrorists has been a popular subject for motion picture producers or fiction writers, it has rarely been dealt with as factually as it has here. The reader is left with little doubt as to the seriousness of the terrorism problem today.

The most interesting sections of the book explain the various options available to governments who must deal with terrorism and the difficulties they face in determining which options to pursue.

The authors explain that many of the prob-

lems democracies and open societies face in dealing with terrorism are not experienced in nations where the citizens have less freedom. Any action against terrorists must be carefully weighed prior to execution. The functions of counterintelligence, and infiltration and surveillance of suspected terrorist or subversive organizations are considered along these lines. As one of the authors summarizes this weighing of values, "We continue to hold that the end justifies the means only within narrowly defined limits. But *certain* ends justify certain means."

The authors provide an excellent explanation of the role of congress in enacting legislation to provide the authority and means to effectively deal with the problem. At the same time, they must ensure adequate constraints to minimize intrusions into our "open society" as much as possible.

The role of the media in dealing with terrorist activity is also explored in-depth. The authors particularly note the ease with which the media can inadvertently be used to aid the terrorists in gaining support for their cause.

The book explains several ways nations can cooperate with each other in dealing with the upsurge in terrorism, as well as options nations may undertake unaided. Those options are explored along economic and military lines.

A considerable portion of **Hydra of Carnage** consists of documentation which supports the position of the authors. Also the book does a remarkable job of supporting allegations of cooperation between the Soviet Union, Cuba and several of the Middle East nations, such as Libya, in sponsoring or assisting many of the terrorist organizations which have been active throughout the world recently.

While the size of **Hydra of Carnage** may discourage some readers at first, the benefit of the authors' expertise and their consideration of the moral and ethical dilemmas makes the book well worth reading.

Gary D. Strohm
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The Rationalization of Terrorism, edited by David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, 1982, University Publications of America.

This book is a compilation of papers and transcripts presented during a three-day symposium on terrorism in 1979 which was hosted by UCLA's Center for International and Strategic Affairs and SUNY's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism. The conference, as the title suggests, attempted to clarify explanations of terrorism and terrorist acts. Attendees included a wide range of educators, security/law enforcement personnel and "think tank" specialists.

The diversity of the views put forth makes the book interesting. Each lecturer presented his thesis explaining terrorist rationale and the need for continual justification by the individual terrorist or terrorist organization represented. All participants were in agreement that the "Act of Terror" is evil . . . terrorism being a violence no one can justify. The participants gathered for panel discussions after each session and the transcripts of those meetings provide some thought provoking insight for the reader.

The conference raised as many questions as it answered. Alfred Loud's contention that, "Terrorists of the twentieth century carry a messianic, prophetic tradition . . . they hold absolutist values that transcend all other values" was expanded upon by Jeanne Knutson's comments, "Terrorism is propaganda of the deed employed by assassin/terrorists who . . . have a deep involvement in a cosmic belief system . . . prior to a murderous attack." And Moshe Amon who called terrorists, "Secular gnostics . . . who see themselves as ridding the world of evil laws and evil rulers, gnostics who believe they know the good side and that knowledge obligates them to destroy evil and the unjust side."

Conference discussions also exposed the attitude change in western civilization concerning terrorism in the years since World War II. The post-war world signalled the end of European dominance in the areas of politics, economics and military affairs and perhaps, most significantly, the "disintegration of a more or less coherent conception of what constituted an acceptable and desirable world order." Into this gap, "Terror by states, totalitarian and dictatorial governments and substate groups has been a recurrent and generally accepted phenomenon of the nation—state system. It has been justified ideologically by nationalism and the revolutionary beliefs of the political right and left."

This attitude appears to be current in light of terrorist attacks as recent as 1985.

I found Edward Glick's "Arab Terrorism and Israeli Retaliation: Some Moral, Psychological and Political Reflections," and Thomas Hachey's "A Courtship with Terrorism: The IRA Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" and "Panel Discussion V" the most interesting, lively reading of the book. The debaters touched on matters such as how **civilly** the IRGUN conducted their campaign against the British and Arabs in the last days prior to participation in Israel or whether there was an exchange of personnel between Israeli, Irish and Indian terrorist groups in the 1940s. The participants also urged more study of the psychopathy of the individual terrorist and the group dynamics of terrorist organizations. This is advice well taken by any military professional interested in expanding his knowledge of what motivates a terrorist.

The reader of this work must understand he is reading a highly academic yet thought provoking work. The going is "dry" for the first 100 pages or so, but ends in a flourish of interesting comments and conclusions that are sensible but more importantly, usable to the professional.

Capt. Rick Ugino
1/209 FA NYARNG

Silent Wings: the Saga of the U.S. Army and Marine Combat Glider Pilots During World War II by Gerard M. Devlin, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

After the advent and dominance of the helicopter, it has been quite a while since anyone has given much thought to gliders as a means of assault. In World War II, nary an airborne operation took place without the inclusion of an assault by glider. Gliders played a notable part in several invasions, particularly in areas adjacent to river crossings and deep behind the lines of penetration. They even made an appearance in the Battle of the Bulge when they participated in the re-supply of the besieged city of Bastogne.

Besides the obvious emphasis on glider operations in World War II, the author provides an excellent history of the glider during the years between the wars. Almost all continental powers experimented with the concept. The chief users were the Germans, the British and the Americans. The Japanese played with the concept and did build some 700 gliders during the war. The U.S. Navy briefly toyed with the idea of using gliders as part of the aviation program to train pilots but subsequently avoided gliders. The Marines also examined the concept, but the vast distances in the Pacific and the topography of possible targets eventually negated their interest.

Spliced throughout **Silent Wings** are stories of the British glider personnel. Apparently, there was a close "brothers-in-arms" relationship between the British and American glider pilots. In the Sicily invasion, many Americans flew British troops into action. Allied cooperation extends even to the book. It was first published by W. H. Allen of London, then by St. Martin's Press in the United States with an introduction by Sir Napier Crookenden, former British airborne leader. The tone toward the British is positive.

The reader will quickly learn that gliders were risky business in war. Collisions occurred, night drops were frequent, and the German's AA fire took a terrific toll. Things went a little better for operations in the Pacific (New Guinea and the Philippines). In Burma the hazard was the landing zone. The bulk of the glider pilots were flight officers and, despite the hazards, were not the glamor boys the engined aircraft pilots were.

Silent Wings is an excellent mixture of both the human side and the technical aspects of World War II airborne operations. Those who flew gliders were considered to be unusual men. They were the regular and career Army soldiers who had their share of heroics and tragedy. Despite heavy losses, that generation made the enemy think of defense as something that required depth, something that consumed manpower and resources. They *were* special and Devlin does a good job telling their story.

Peter C. Unsinger
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The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy by Joseph J. Collins, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1986, 175 pages.

In this compact study, Collins sets out to analyze the Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan, how the invasion and subsequent military operations were conducted, how the invasion compares to previous Soviet uses of force, and whether the invasion is indicative of any trends in Soviet foreign policy.

In the first half of the book, Collins offers an excellent summary of Soviet-Afghan relations from 1938 to just after the invasion. The chronology serves as a foundation for the non-specialist and as an initial exploration into the possibility of a long-term Soviet plan for occupation and/or direct control of Afghanistan. Collins finds that prior to World War II, Soviet policy focused on keeping their Afghan border free from turbulence. Interest and involvement in Afghanistan deepened with British withdraw-

al from India after the war, and again later as the inability of the Afghan political system to handle urbanization and modernization in the 1960s planted the seeds of internal instability. The long history of state-to-state relations, coupled with opportunities to influence Afghan internal affairs through the indigenous Communist party (the PDPA), created a web of Soviet involvement which culminated in invasion after a decade of increasing instability. In short, Collins finds no evidence to support any "grand scheme" theories of Soviet expansion.

Following this able summary, Collins devotes two chapters to a deeper look at Soviet motives which only seem to cloud the issue. Although he has made a convincing case for prestige, security concerns and absence of constraints as primary motives for the invasion, Collins attempts to further refute the grand scheme theories. He dismisses the suggestion that the invasion was a strategic move toward the Persian Gulf by contending that holding Afghanistan should offer military advantages to facilitate that objective (Isn't the geographical gain alone significant?), that facilities in Afghanistan provide only marginal military benefits, and that operations could not be launched from bases threatened by the insurgents, although he claims the Soviets didn't expect an insurgency. Another point of confusion concerns Soviet perceptions of U.S. intentions. Collins maintains that a strong U.S. reaction was not expected, but that the Soviets did believe the United States to be preparing imminent armed action against Iran. Both are cited as motivating factors, although seemingly consistent. Overall, the two chapters appear confused and weak.

Concerning the other points of analysis, Collins believes that the invasion of Afghanistan was a close copy of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The high percentage of Central Asian reservists in the Afghanistan invasion force indicates Soviet beliefs that they would encounter little resistance, and they would need to remain in Afghanistan only long enough to allow the regime to consolidate. The continuing insurgency and instability brought a realignment of the Soviet force for protracted counterinsurgency operations. Since then, the Soviets have explored the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the Afghan war while remaining ready to continue the war at its present level if peace cannot be secured on their terms.

While Collins sees no fundamental shift in Soviet policy vis-a-vis the United States as a result of the invasion and its aftermath, he is concerned that Soviet success in Afghanistan will encourage the Soviet leadership to believe that the Czechoslovakian formula is readily applicable to other Third World conflicts. The fear is exaggerated, given Collins' own thorough discussion of the Soviets' unexpected problems in Afghanistan. His closing recommendations for Western assistance to the insurgent cause seem out of place in an otherwise detached and scholarly study.

Despite its flaws, Collins has produced an introduction to the Afghan problem well worth reading.

Capt. Chris A. Pilecki
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Patton—The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 by Martin Blumenson, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985, $17.95

Few names in the history of the U.S. Army evoke the same mystique as the name "Patton." Separating Patton the legend from Patton the man is a challenging task for the historian as well as the World War II "buff." The task is somewhat more difficult as a result of Academy Award winner George C. Scott's portrayal of Gen. George S. Patton in the 1970 movie **Patton**. "Blood and Guts" Patton presents a study in personal courage, strong leadership, tactical brilliance, insecurity, vanity and irony. In the study of Patton we once again face the issue, "Do events make great men or do great men make events" on the stage of history. Perhaps, as in the case of Patton, the answers are yes and yes.

Martin Blumenson began his long association with Patton early in 1945 when he joined Patton's Third Army Headquarters in Luxemburg. Blumenson "never knew my commanding general, never talked to him; I gazed at him in wonder from afar: his exploits were legendary." Blumenson recorded Patton's battlefield achievements in Normandy in **Breakout and Pursuit**, published in 1961. He followed up with **The Patton Papers**, in two volumes in 1972 and 1974. As his research and maturity of reflection progressed, he wrote the book being reviewed which was published coincidently with the 100th anniversary of Patton's birth. In this thoughtful biography Blumenson traces the usual childhood to manhood development pausing along the way to briefly describe Patton's year at the Virginia Military Institute prior to his appointment to the Military Academy at West Point in June 1904. Patton was independently wealthy and although his father-in-law (Patton married in 1910) encouraged him to pursue interests with more financial potential, Patton was compelled to pursue a career in the U.S. Army. At a relatively early period in his career Patton sensed a destiny that would bring him fame, if not fortune.

Patton's first duty in a combat environment occurred when he successfully sought assignment in 1916 to Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing's "Punitive Expedition Force" which unsuccessfully pursued the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa. During this experience Patton gained valuable insight into the need for tactical mobility, logistics, communications and coordination with adjacent units. Best of all, Patton joined Pershing's inner circle and made other acquaintances which would affect him throughout his career.

When Pershing was ordered to deploy an expeditionary force to France following America's delayed entry into World War I, Patton, because of his earlier association with Pershing, was asked to join the senior officer's staff. Pershing's fondness for Patton's sister, Nita, probably didn't hurt Patton's chances of getting "over there." Patton distinguished himself in war, earning the Distinguished Service Cross for personal bravery and the Distinguished Service Medal for his unit's "finest spirit and discipline." Of greater significance to history was Patton's emerging interest in tank warfare. Service in France also afforded Patton an opportunity to know the best and brightest of the post war Army—Pershing, Summerall, Craig, Fox Conner, and perhaps the single greatest military mind of the era, George C. Marshall. Patton was emerging as a unique officer committed to discipline, offensive spirit and hard training. Like many World War I officers, Patton was reduced in rank from colonel to captain following the war, but was soon promoted to the rank of major.

During the two decades between the two World Wars Patton's career experienced a series of advances and set-backs which Blumenson describes well. Other officers of World War I fame experienced similar ups and downs during this period. As the clouds of World War II appeared on the horizon, Patton emerged from the interwar period ready to lead Americans into combat. He distinguished himself in the Louisiana maneuvers and contributed greatly to developing the Second Armored Division (Hell on Wheels) into a combat ready division and model of the offensive spirit which came to characterize armor operations. He worked his men hard, turning civilians into soldiers. He continued this emphasis in subsequent commands at the corps and army levels. Blumenson provides a glimpse into the interpersonal relationships among Patton, Eisenhower, Bradley and the other giants of the period. He characterizes Patton as a driven man during the war years—a man pursuing a destiny. Patton's wartime exploits are well chronicled and won't be repeated here.

Had the war ended in August 1944, Patton's successes in North America and later following D-Day across France would have established him as a bonafide great combat commander. However, his greatest success as a commander occurred when he led the Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge to relieve 101st Airborne Division soldiers holding Bastogne. Patton died on December 21, 1945, from injuries sustained in a vehicle accident, which occurred December 9, 1945, one day before he was to return to America and the adulation of a grateful nation. Those of us who study military history and military leadership realize that George Patton was not perfect and that some of his actions appear questionable in hindsight. However, his greatness as a soldier, leader, tactician, trainer and commander must be recognized and studied. He is one of our great ones. Blumenson tells the Patton story well and provides a sensitive selection of photographs to enhance the story.

Maj. John D. Skelton
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103d Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI)



Oriental Blue and Silver Gray are the colors associated with the Military Intelligence Corps. The Wyvern's head has been adapted from the Coat Of Arms of the Third Infantry Division. The Wyvern is a heraldic creature known as a fearless guardian; symbolic of the intelligence mission. The lightning bolt on the engrailed bend alludes to the battalion's special interest in communications. The scarlet and yellow quarters refer to the Arms of Wuerzburg, the unit's location and its place of activation. The flag bears the unit's motto: "Top of the Rock."

Although the 103d was formed as a battalion just five years ago, its lineage can be traced back to World War II. The battalion takes it lineage from the 851st ASA Company and 3d MI Company, both of which merged to form the 103d in September 1981.

The 851st ASA Company was originally formed as the 3377th Signal Service Detachment. The 3377th was activated during January 1945 on Luzon in the Philippine Islands. The unit was reorganized several times until October 1951 when it was redesignated the 851st Communications Reconnaissance Detachment. The Detachment participated in four Korean campaigns, including the 1st U.N. Counteroffensive, and was deactivated in Japan during August 1956. Later that year, the unit was briefly reactivated as the 851st ASA Detachment. It was finally designated the 851st ASA Company and reactivated in 1974.

The 3d MI Company was activated in France during September 1944 as the 3d Counterintelligence Corps. It was inactivated September 1946 after having participated in four World War II campaigns, including Rhineland and Ardennes-Alsace. In 1949, the company was reactivated and served in the Korean War. It participated in eight campaigns including the Chinese Communist Force Intervention and the second and third Korean Winters. During January 1958, the unit was reorganized and redesignated the 3d Military Intelligence Detachment and attached to the Third Infantry Division. The detachment was assigned to 3ID in April 1974.

Since its organization as a battalion in 1981, the 103d has participated in numerous exercises throughout Germany (including the last five REFORGER exercises), and in a number of NATO countries. On a continual basis, the battalion trains its surveillance assets and conducts live environment training. The battalion completed AOE Transition in October 1985. Its mission is to provide Intelligence and Electronic Warfare support to the Third Infantry Division.

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